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Thi s paper presents econom et r i c evidence t hat  sheds new  li ght  on t he rol e played by 
f i nanci al li berali zati on i n t he K orean and Thai  fi nanci al cri ses. Dr aw ing on previous 
em pir i cal  studi es,  i t   argues t hat   wh i l e t he banki ng system s of  bot h Ko r ea and Thai l and 
support ed t hei r   r em arkabl e l ong-run  grow t h  perf orm ance,  t hey  we r e i l l   prepared t o  f ace 
t he  r i sks em anati ng  f r om   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.   Ne w  evidence  i s t hen  presented wh i ch 
show s t hat  fi nanci al li berali zati on set  in m ot i on a classic credit -asset  boom  and bust  
cycle i n Thai l and and created ot her  w eaknesses i n t he Ko r ean f i nanci al  system ,  wh i ch 
m ade bot h econom i es vul nerable t o t he sent i me n t s of foreign i nvest ors and l enders.
Wh e n   capit al  f l ow s we r e r eversed,  t he ensuing l i qui di t y cri sis t r i ggered a bust   t hat   wa s  
f urt her  m agni f i ed by  curr ency depreciati ons  and  i nt erest  r ate hi kes.  
I n t he l i ght  of thi s analysi s, the paper argues that  besi des str engt heni ng prudent i al 
r egul ati on  and  account i ng  standards,   t here i s a need f or  upgrading  m anagem ent   system s 
and expert i se t o deal  wi t h f i nanci al  r i sks and an i m port ant  need f or  a mo r e wi despread 
appreciati on of the ri sks associated w it h fi nanci al li berali zati on.   Furt hermo r e, there 
r em ain  gaps  i n  t he  i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  archit ecture t hat   need t o  be  addressed,  such as 
t he absence of an eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal  l ender of l ast r esort .  Gi ven t hat  t hese
w eaknesses m ay requi r e a long t i me  t o address,  i t   i s argued t hat   i n t he i nt eri m  peri od 
f i nanci al  r estr aint s can act  as a r elati vel y cheap,  eff ecti ve and t r ansparent  safety devi ce 
i n  safeguardi ng  f i nanci al  stabil i t y.
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Fi nanci al   Li berali zati on  and  C redi t-A sset  Boom s  and  Bus t s i n  Eas t   As i a
By  Pani cos O.   De me t riades
1. Introduct i on
Tw o years aft er t he A si an fi nanci al cri sis, t he l i t erature on t he subj ect i s alr eady
vol um i nous.
2  Ho we v e r ,  mu c h  o f  it  shies aw ay fr om  expl ori ng t he w eaknesses i n t he 
i nt ernat i onal  fi nanci al system , focusi ng i nst ead on the w eak fi nanci al fundam ent als 
em anati ng  f r om   t he  As i an De v e l opm ent   M odel ,   wh i ch i s bl am ed f or  encouraging  mo r al 
hazard behavi or,  corr upt i on and bad l endi ng practi ces. The mai n consequence of
f ocusi ng on t he l att er is that  it  entail s onl y m argi nal  imp r ovem ent s in t he i nt ernat i onal  
f i nanci al  archit ecture wh i l e pol i cy prescri pt i ons  and  m odel s t hat   are prescri bed  en-m ass
t o em ergi ng m arket  econom i es need not be re-assessed, except perhaps for som e
provi sos concerni ng prudent i al regul ati on,  account i ng st andards and bankrupt cy law s.
Ye t  the vul nerabil i t i es that  led to t he A si an cri sis are alr eady appeari ng el sew here, in 
count r i es that  are curr entl y em barki ng on t hei r  ow n fi nanci al l i berali zati on
progra mme s .
3
A g r ow i ng num ber of authors, perhaps on deeper refl ecti on,  is how ever begi nni ng t o 
r ecogni ze t hat   w eaknesses i n  t he  i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  system  pl ayed a decisive  r ol e i n 
bot h creati ng t he vul nerabil i t i es that  l ed to t he A si an cri sis and am pl i f yi ng t hei r
m agni t ude.
4  One i m port ant aspect of curr ent i nt ernat i onal  f i nanci al arr angem ent s,
wh i ch thi s paper focuses on,  is thei r  predisposi t i on t ow ard uni nhi bi t ed m ovem ent s of 
capit al around t he gl obe.  Emer gi ng m arket  econom i es have been acti vel y encouraged 
t o open up t hei r  fi nanci al system s to foreign capi t al,  li berali ze thei r  int erest rates and 
i ncrease com peti t i on  i n  t hei r   f i nanci al  system s,  on  t he  understandi ng  t hat   t hese  r eforms  
wi l l   i ncrease f i nanci al  deepening,   eff i ciency and grow t h.
5  The  OECD,   t he EU  and t he 
I MF   have been ( and cont i nue t o be)  key pl ayers i n t hi s r egard.     The  r esult i ng i ncreases 
i n  i nt ernat i onal   capit al  m obi l i t y  have,   how ever,   been f ol l ow ed  by  i ncreased vol ati l i t y  i n 
f i nanci al  ma r ket s,  as we l l   as i nci dent s of  f i nanci al  f r agil i t y and cri sis.    Thus,   f i nanci al
l i berali zati on result ed in hi gh econom i c and social costs, i nst ead of t he i ncreased
eff i ciency predicted by i t s advocates.
6, 7 These developm ent s have exposed i m port ant 
gaps  i n  t he  i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  system ,  and  are arguabl y  r esponsi bl e f or  t he  r eturn  of 
‘ depression econom i cs’ (Kr ugm an,  1999).   It  is therefore vit al to analyze the A si an
2 For  a recent com prehensive overvi ew of mo s t  aspects of the cri sis see the col l ecti on of papers in 
H unt er,   Ka u f ma n   and  Kr ueger  ( 1999).
3 An  i m port ant curr ent exam ple is the EU  accession econom i es, wh i ch are in t he process of
‘ harm oni zing’  t hei r   f i nanci al  system s.    See  also f oot not e  19.  
4  See  f or  exam ple  Kr ugm an  ( 1999)  and  com pare  wi t h  Kr ugm an  ( 1998).
5  For   a  good  exposi t i on  of  t he  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  t hesi s see  Fr y  ( 1997)  or  Fr y  ( 1995).
6  For   an em pir i cal  analysi s of  t he  corr elati on  bet w een f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  and  f i nanci al  f r agil i t y  see 
De mi r güç- K unt   and  De t ragiache  (1998).     For   a  specific  exam ple  from  Lat i n  Ame r i ca  see  Di az- Al ejandro
( 1985).
7  I n  som e sense t hi s i s not   surpri sing  gi ven  t hat   t he  t r adit i onal   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  t hesi s i s based  on 
perf ectl y com peti t i ve m odel s,   wh i ch predate t he  econom i cs of  i nforma t i on  r evol ut i on.     I t ,   t herefore,  f ail s 
t o acknow l edge t he i mp l i cati ons of i mp e r f ect informa t i on and i mpe r f ect  com peti t i on (see Ar esti s and 
De me t r i ades 1999;   St i gl i t z,  1994).-2 -
cri sis fr om  an i nt ernat i onal  perspecti ve,  usi ng em pi r i cal analysi s to exam ine t he
m echanism s and vul nerabil i t i es created by f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.   Thi s paper ma k e s  a 
f i r st step in t hi s dir ecti on by presenti ng econom et r i c evidence t hat  sheds li ght  on t he 
r ol e played by fi nanci al li berali zati on i n t he K orean and Thai fi nanci al cri ses.  In t he 
l i ght  of thi s evidence i t  re-exam ines t he val i di t y of som e popul ar expl anati ons of  t he 
cri sis and  presents new   i nsi ght s on  r elevant  pol i cy i ssues. 
The paper' s cont ents are str uct ured as fol l ow s.   Secti on 2 gat hers evidence fr om
previous  em pir i cal  studi es wh i ch casts doubt   on  t he  ‘ f undam ent als’  vi ew  of  t he  cri sis i n 
t hat  bot h t he K orean and Thai fi nanci al system s support ed the rem arkabl e long-t erm
econom i c grow t h perf orm ance of thei r  count r i es. Secti on 3 presents the result s of an 
econom et r i c analysi s of  t he r elati onshi p bet w een f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   capit al  f l ow s,  
dom esti c credit  and st ock m arket  pri ces in Thai l and and K orea.  These new  result s 
dem onst r ate that  fi nanci al li berali zati on set  in m ot i on a classic credit -asset  pri ce boom  
and bust   cycle i n Thai l and and i ncreased f r agil i t y i n t he Ko r ean f i nanci al  system .    The 
sam e secti on m akes t he case that  bot h cri ses exhibi t ed characteri sti cs of a fi nanci al 
pani c, result i ng fr om  i ncreased vulnerabil i t y t o foreign i nvest or senti me n t s and t he 
absence of an eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal  lender of last resort .   Secti on 4 di scusses w ider
pol i cy i ssues i n t he l i ght   of  t he em pir i cal  evidence.     Fi nal l y,   secti on 5 s u mma r i ses and 
off ers som e i deas f or  f urt her  r esearch.
2.   W eak  Fi nanci al   Fundam ent al s? 
Ther e is w idespread agreem ent t hat  t he t r adit i onal  f undam ent als view  of ' f i r st-
generati on'cri sis m odel s ( e.g.   Kr ugm an,   1979)  can not   adequately expl ain t he ori gi ns 
of the A si an cri sis (e.g.  Gl i ck, 1999;  De me t r i ades and Fatt ouh,  1999b).   G row t h and 
i nvest me n t   r ates we r e hi gh,   budget   defi cit s we r e non-exi stent  and i nfl ati on r ates we r e 
r elati vel yl ow .   W hil e there w as som e evidence of grow i ng curr ent account  defi cit s 
before the cri sis-  r efl ecti ng a sl ow dow n i n export s due t o real exchange rate
appreciati on  and  t he  stagnat i on  of  t he  Japanese  econom y - t hese  defi cit s we r e generall y 
perceived t o be ‘ beni gn’,   as t hey we r e covered by capit al  i nfl ow s wh i ch f unded l ong-
t erm  i nvest me n t   ( Gl i ck,  1999).
A n e w v a r i ant of the fundam ent als view , how ever,  ascri bes t he A si an cri sis to w eak 
f i nanci al  f undam ent als.    I n  t hi s r egard,   mu c h   has  been said  about   ‘ bad  banki ng’  and  t he 
As i an D evelopm ent  M odel  at t he centr e of wh i ch li e close l i nks bet w een banks,
i ndust r y and governm ent ,  as it  encouraged “imp r udent  l endi ng …  and corr upt
practi ces” ( I MF ,   1997,   p. 12).     Kr ugm an  ( 1998)  goes  f urt her  i n  stati ng  t hat   “… the  As i an 
cri sis …w a s   ma i nl y  about   bad  banki ng”
8.     Thus,   i nst ead of  m acroeconom i c i mb a l ances, 
we   have  str uct ural  f i nanci al  di stort i ons,   i ncl udi ng  di r ected l endi ng,   and  di sincenti ves  t o 
m anage ri sk eff ecti vel y because of imp l i cit  or expl i cit  governm ent  guarantees - the
popul ar  mo r al  hazard argum ent .     Wh i l e t here i s no doubt   t hat   t he r i sks associated wi t h 
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  we r e i nadequat ely  m anaged  ( see secti ons  3  and  4),   t he  em pir i cal 
evidence  on  bad  l endi ng  practi ces bef ore  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on t ook pl ace i s w eak.    I n 
i t self  the presence of non-perf ormi ng l oans i n t he system , on w hi ch w e have som e 
8  No t e,  how ever,   t hat   Kr ugm an  ( 1999)  off ers  a  r ather  di f f erent  vi ew ,  ascri bi ng  t he  cri sis t o  w eaknesses i n 
t he  i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  system .-3 -
evidence for (e.g.  Ca pr i o and K l i ngebi el,  1996),  i s not  suff i cient t o concl ude t hat
f i nanci al w eaknesses w ere responsi bl e for the cri sis.  In t hi s regard D em et r i ades and 
Fat t ouh (1999b) show  t hat  since the earl y 1970s a proport i on of tot al credit  rangi ng 
f r om  5-11%  i n K orea w as ‘unproduct i ve’ but  that  duri ng t he 1990s t hi s probl em  w as 
l ess severe t han duri ng t he 1980s.     They  t herefore argue t hat   t hi s w eakness alone  can 
not   expl ain  t he  cri sis.
As   an anti dot e t o t he ‘ bad banki ng’  vi ew ,  t hi s secti on off ers som e l ong-run t i me - s e r i es
evidence for the peri od 1961-95 t hat  dem onst r ates that  the banki ng system s of Sout h 
Ko r ea and Thail and cont r i but ed signi f i cantl y t o l ong-run econom i c grow t h,  l argel y
t hrough  enhanci ng  t he  average product i vi t y  of  capit al.       Thi s evidence  i s gat hered f r om  
a num ber  of  previous  papers,  i ncl udi ng  som e wr i t t en we l l   before t he  cri sis. 
De me t r i ades and H ussein ( 1996)  i n t hei r   analysi s of  t he l ong-run  r elati onshi p  bet w een 
f i nanci al devel opm ent  (m easured by t he rati o of bank deposi t s or credit  to  GDP)  and 
econom i c grow t h i n 16 devel opi ng count r i es over t he peri od 1960-93 fi nd t he
f ol l ow i ng:
¾  I n bot h Ko r ea and Thai l and t he r elati onshi p bet w een f i nanci al  devel opm ent  
and  econom i c grow t h  i s bi -dir ecti onal .     That   i s t o  say f i nanci al  devel opm ent  
Gr anger  causes econom i c grow t h  and  vi ce-versa.
¾  To put  the above fi ndi ng i n perspecti ve,  in t h e  s a me  s a mp l e of count r i es 
usi ng t he sam e me t hods t here are seven countr i es f or  wh i ch t he r elati onshi p 
bet w een fi nanci al devel opm ent  and econom i c grow t h exhi bi t s reverse
causali t y (i . e. econom i c grow t h G ranger causes fi nanci al devel opm ent  but  
not  vi ce-versa).   These count r i es are C osta R ica, El  Sal vador,  Gr eece,
Paki stan,  Port ugal ,   Sout h  Af r i ca and  Tur key.
I n a recent paper De me t r i ades, Ar esti s and Fat t ouh (1999) exam ine t he eff ects of
f i nanci al devel opm ent  (m easured by t he rati o of bank credit  to  GDP)  and fi nanci al 
pol i cies on t he average product i vi t y of capit al in ei ght  devel oped econom i es and six 
devel opi ng ones.   T heir  sam ple covers the peri od 1955-95 for devel oped econom i es 
and 1961-95 f or  devel opi ng ones.     Bot h Ko r ea and Thai l and are i ncl uded.     Cont r ol l i ng 
f or input s (capit al stock and em pl oym ent )  and fi xed eff ects, they fi nd t hat  fi nanci al 
devel opm ent   i n bot h Thai l and and Ko r ea had a posi t i ve and signi f i cant  l ong-run  eff ect 
on t he average product i vi t y of capit al and,  consequent l y,  on econom i c grow t h.   It  is 
very i nst r uct i ve t o quant i f y t he i mp l i ed contr i but i on of the fi nanci al sector of these 
count r i es and com pare i t   wi t h t hat   of  ot her  count r i es i n t he sam e dat a set.     Thus,   usi ng 
t he dat a set and est i ma t es of De me t r i ades et al ,  t he cont r i but i ons of f i nanci al
devel opm ent  and fi nanci al pol i cies to econom i c grow t h over the sam e peri od for the 
sam e group  of  count r i es are calculated and  presented i n  Tabl e 1.
The evidence presented in Tabl e 1 cont r adicts the not i on t hat  there w as som ethi ng 
f undam ent all y w rong w i t h t he banki ng system s of Ko r ea and Thail and.   In fact,  the 
cont r i buti on of the Thai  banki ng system  to grow t h i s the hi ghest  of all  the count r i es 
i ncl uded  i n  t he  t able ( colum n  3)  wh i l e t he  cont r i but i on  of  t he  Ko r ean banki ng  system  i s 
f ourt h i n t hi s r anki ng,   at  par  wi t h t hat   of  t he UK.     I t   i s wo r t h not i ng t hat   Ge r m any and 
t he U S enj oy t he second posi t i on i n t hi s ranki ng,  closel y behi nd Thai l and.   It  is also -4 -
i nt eresti ng t o observe fr om  col um n 4 of the t able that  Ko r ea is the count r y i n w hi ch 
f i nanci al pol i cies appeared to have cont r i but ed m ost to econom i c grow t h (a sizeable 
half   a percentage poi nt   per  annum )  wh i l e i n Thai l and t hey appear  t o have had a mu c h  
sm all er  posi t i ve  eff ect.     To  put   t hi s i n  perspecti ve,   f i nanci al  pol i cies appear  t o  have  had 
negat i ve eff ects in seven count r i es.  N ote also that  these pol i cies for Ko r ea w ere,  on 
average, of the fi nanci al restr aint  type i n t hat  they i ncl uded i nt erest rate and capit al 
cont r ol s.
Tabl e 1.Fi nanci al   D evelopm ent   and  Econom i c Gr o wt h  f or  Sel ected Count ries:
1955-95
*








Tot al   Fi nanci al  
Sector
Au s t r ali a3 . 88 3. 58 0. 11 0. 05 0. 16
Fi nl and 3.40 3. 67 0. 17 -0. 20 -0. 03
Fr ance 3. 66 2. 92 0. 00 0. 20 0. 20
Ge r ma n y 3 . 79 2. 86 0. 90 -0. 40 0. 50
Gr eece 3. 88 3. 99 0. 05 -0. 16 -0. 11
I ndi a4 . 26 4. 56 0. 07 -0. 07 0. 00
Ko r ea 8. 16 7. 62 0. 40 0. 50 0. 90
Ne w  Zealand 2.87 3. 10 0. 08 -0. 50 -0. 42
Thai l and 7.52 6. 38 1. 16 0. 05 1. 21
Phi l i ppi nes 3. 83 4. 70 0. 15 -0. 74 -0. 59
Sw eden 2. 67 2. 22 0. 14 0. 25 0. 39
UK 2 . 40 1. 76 0. 40 0. 09 0. 49
US 2 . 75 2. 31 0. 90 -0. 11 0. 79
*Source:  De me t r i ades,  Ar esti s and  Fat t ouh  ( 1999);   t he  sam ple  i s 1961-95  for devel opi ng  count ries.
The overall  cont r i but i on of the fi nanci al sector to econom i c grow t h (t he com bi ned 
cont r i but i on  of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and  f i nanci al  r estr aint s show n  i n  colum n  5)  i s t he 
hi ghest   i n  Thai l and  and  second  hi ghest   i n  Ko r ea.    These r esult s cast  consi derable doubt  
on t he not i on t hat  the banki ng system s of Ko r ea and Thail and si mp l y funct i oned t o 
serve t he needs of narr ow  pol i t i cal i nt erests w it hout  payi ng at t enti on t o w i der
eff i ciency consi derati ons - t he curr entl y popul ar not i on of ‘crony capi t ali sm ’.  Wh i l e 
r elati onshi p banki ng i n Thai l and and governm ent   cont r ol l ed banki ng i n Ko r ea ma y   be 
pri me   suspects f or  t he cri sis,  t he em pir i cal  evidence suggest s t hat   t he f i nanci al  system s
of Ko r ea and Thail and w orked reasonabl y w el l  pri or t o fi nanci al l i berali zati on,
cont r i but i ng  t o  t hei r   r em arkabl e l ong-t erm  grow t h  perf orm ance.
The  close r elati ons bet w een governm ent ,   i ndust r y and banks i n Thai l and and Ko r ea,  a 
f eature present also in ot her As i an banki ng system s, provi des an alt ernat i ve w ay of
addressing i nforma t i on i mp e r f ecti ons i n fi nanci al ma r ket s to t he A ngl o-Saxon m odel .  
The  r esult s presented i n t hi s secti on suggest   t hat   t hi s alt ernat i ve me t hod wa s   at  l east  as 
eff ecti ve as t he A ngl o-Saxon approach. The l att er reli es heavil y on good account i ng 
standards,  i nforma t i on di sclosure and eff ecti ve prudent i al regul ati on t o address the
agency probl em s em anati ng f r om  credit   ma r ket   i mp e r f ecti ons.   I n t he presence of  close 
r elati ons bet w een t he provi ders and recipi ents of fi nanci al capit al,  these i nst i t ut i onal  -5 -
f eatures are not   cri t i cal  f or  addressing  agency probl em s.    Thi s ma y   expl ain  w hy  pri or  t o 
f i nanci al l i berali zati on,  t he Thai  and K orean banki ng system s m ade a posi t i ve
cont r i but i on t o t he l ong-run grow t h perf orm ance of t hei r  count r i es w it hout  havi ng
A ngl o-Saxon  i nst i t ut i onal   standards.   Ho we v e r ,   under  l i berali sed condi t i ons  t he  absence 
of  t hese  standards  becam e a source of  vul nerabil i t y,   as access t o  f oreign  capit al  wa s   not  
condi t i onal   on  cl ose  r elati ons  bet w een provi ders and  r ecipi ents of  credit .
A  caveat is now  i n order.   Int ernat i onal  com pari sons of the t ype presented in t hi s 
secti on mu s t   nat urall y be i nt erpreted wi t h a healt hy degree of  cauti on because of  dat a 
and m et hodol ogi cal li mi t ati ons.     Ho we v e r ,   i n t hi s case t hi s i s t em pered by t he f act  t hat  
t he sam e me t hods and dat a sources are used t o obt ain all   t he r esult s presented i n Tabl e 
1.   Specif i call y,   t he  equat i ons  are esti ma t ed usi ng  SUR  analysi s,  wi t hout   any  r estr i cti ons 
i m posed on any of  t he coeff i cients,  all   of  wh i ch are all ow ed t o vary across countr i es.
Fur t hermo r e, the t i me - s e r i es propert i es of the dat a are respected by carr yi ng out  uni t  
r oot   t ests and appropri ate esti ma t i on me t hods,   wh i ch f i l t er  out   t he short -run  dynam i cs 
f r om t he l ong-run r elati onshi p.
9 Fi nal l y,   since t he r esult s presented i n Tabl e 1,   are not  
onl y pl ausibl e ( i n t hat   t hey ma y   conform  t o wi del y hel d vi ew s concerni ng t he r elati ve 
eff i cacy of these system s) but  are also consi stent wi t h a num ber of ot her em pir i cal 
studi es.  For  exam ple, t hese result s are broadl y consi stent wi t h t he analysi s of
product i vi t y  i n  Sout h  and  Eas t   As i an econom i es by  De me t r i ades,  De v e r eux  and  Lui nt el 
( 1998).     The  r esult s on I ndi a are also consi stent  wi t h De me t r i ades and Lui nt el  ( 1997) 
and conform  t o t he wi del y hel d vi ew  t hat   t he I ndi an f i nanci al  system  i s over -regul ated
and i neff i cient.   The result s on K orea are consistent wi t h D em et r i ades and Luint el 
( 1996),  w ho provi de a det ail ed analysi s of the m echanism s through w hi ch fi nanci al 
r estr aints i n Ko r ea hel ped t o prom ot e f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and grow t h.     Fi nal l y,   not e 
t hat  the i mp l i ed TFP esti ma t es for Ko r ea and Thail and are com parable to Y oung’s 
( 1995).
The  analysi s presented i n  t hi s secti on  all ow s  t he  f ol l ow i ng  concl usi ons:
1. There is no l ong-run evi dence t o suggest  that  the banki ng system s of Ko r ea and 
Thai l and  we r e f undam ent all y  f l aw ed or  t hat   t hey  had  i nherent  w eaknesses t hat   we r e 
r esponsi bl e for the cri sis. Inst ead, the evi dence suggest s that  they support ed thei r  
r em arkabl e l ong-run  grow t h perf orm ance.
2. The m ai n ‘w eakness’ i n t he Thai  and K orean banki ng system s w as that  t hei r
i nst i t ut i onal  fr am ew ork,  incl udi ng prudent i al regul ati on and account i ng st andards,  
wa s   not   aime d   at  addressing  t he  agency probl em s ari sing  f r om   arms - l engt h  r elati ons 
bet w een credit ors and debt ors,  wh i ch wa s   t ypi cal  of  capit al  i nfl ow s.     I n t hi s sense 
t hey  we r e i l l   prepared t o  operate under  f i nanci all y  l i berali zed condi t i ons.
To  concl ude,   wh i l e t he Ko r ean and Thai   banki ng system s appear  t o have wo r ked we l l  
under fair l y cl osed governm ent  cont r ol l ed envir onm ent s, it  is now  evi dent  that  they
l acked bot h t he i nst i t ut i onal   f r am ew ork and t he expert i se t o f unct i on eff ecti vel y i n an 
envi r onm ent   of  open l i berali zed f i nanci al  ma r ket s
10.   The  m echanism s t hat   exposed and 
9 The authors use a coint egrati on est i ma t or wi t h good sm al l  sam ple propert i es (DOLS:  St ock and 
Wa t son,   1993).
10  On e   analogy  i s t hat   pri or  t o  f i nanci al  l i ber ali zati on  As i an  banks  coul d  be  t hought   of  as  dri vi ng 
l ocom ot i ves  on  a  t r ack  safely  l aid  dow n  by  t hei r   governm ent s,  wh i l e  wa t ching  banks  i n  f i nanci all y 
devel oped  econom i es  dri vi ng  f l ashy  f ast  cars on  a  parall el  Ame r i can  styl e  6- l ane  hi ghw ay.     Wh e n  
l i berali zati on  t ook  pl ace,  t hey  we r e  encouraged  t o  j oi n  t hi s m agni f i cent  hi ghw ay,   wi t hout   bei ng  wa r ned -6 -
exacerbat ed these w eaknesses, creati ng t he vul nerabil i t i es that  l ed to t he fi nanci al
cri sis,  are expl ored i n  t he  r est  of  t he  paper.  
3. C api t al   A ccount  Li berali zati on  and  Boom -Bus t   Cy c l es
Thi s secti on  presents new   em pir i cal  evidence  on  t he  underl yi ng  causes and  m echanism s
t hat   l ed t o and am pli f i ed t he Thai   and Ko r ean f i nanci al  cri ses.    I n so doi ng i t   uncovers 
i m port ant  simi l ari t i es and di f f erences bet w een t he t wo   cri ses.    Specif i call y,   evidence i s 
presented wh i ch suggest s t hat :
( i )I n bot h cri ses fi nanci al li berali zati on pl ayed a catalyt i c rol e, all ow i ng capi t al 
i nfl ow s t o set  in m ot i on m echanism s (r eacti ons?) that  created vul nerabil i t i es 
wh i ch all ow ed t he cri sis to occur;  these m echanism s w ere not  ident i cal in t he 
t wo   cases. 
( i i )B o t h cri ses have elem ents of a self -ful f i l l i ng bank pani c by foreign l enders, 
wh i ch m agni f i ed and  exacerbat ed t he  bust .
( i i i )T h e   Thai   cri sis wa s   a vari ant  of  t he  classic ‘ credit   boom   and  bust ’   phenom enon,  
wi t h capit al  i nfl ow s pl aying an acti ve r ol e i n creati ng and propagat i ng an asset 
pri ce boom-bust   cycle.  Int eresti ngl y,  dom est i c bank credit  pl ayed a relati vel y 
passive r ol e i n t hi s process wh i l e t ot al  credit ,   wh i ch i ncl udes credit   by f i nance 
com panies,  pl ayed a mo r e acti ve  r ol e.
( i v) The K orean cri sis, on t he ot her hand,  appears to be very m uch a case of
i nadequat e m anagem ent  of vari ous ri sks em anati ng fr om  capit al i nfl ow s
r esult i ng f r om  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.
The mai n ai m o f  the econom et r i c analysi s is to shed new  l i ght  on t he rol e played by 
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  and  capit al  f l ow s  i n  t he  credit -asset  boom   and  bust   cycle.    Thus,  
t he f ol l ow i ng key vari ables,  avail able on a quart erl y f r equency f or  t he peri od 1983 t o 
1998,  are m odel l ed: stock pri ce index (a reasonabl e proxy for asset pri ces)
11,  real
dom est i c credit ,  the real stock of foreign l i abil i t i es in dom est i c curr ency t erms ,   and a 
s u mma r y m easure of fi nanci al restr aint s.  T he latt er incorporates contr ol s on i nt erest 
r ates and  capit al  f l ow s
12.   For   Ko r ea we   are also able t o  use  r eal  GDP,   quart erl y  dat a f or 
wh i ch are also avail able f or  t he  sam e peri od.     The  precise defi ni t i ons  of  t hese  vari ables 
and  t he  dat a sources are gi ven  i n  t he  Da t a A ppendi x.
The f our fi nanci al vari ables are plot t ed in Fi gures 1 and 2 over the w hol e sam ple 
peri od.     I t   i s i nt eresti ng  t o  not e t hat   f ocusi ng  on  a mu c h   short er  wi ndow   as mo s t   studi es
have  done  ( a f ew  m ont hs  before and  aft er  t he  cri sis)  t ends  t o  ma s k   i m port ant  l ong-t erm
t r ends  i n  t he  dat a.    I m port antl y,   wh i l e t here i s som e evidence  of  a stock  ma r ket   boom   i n 
Ko r ea in 1994,  thi s represents m ostl y a recovery of stock pri ces to t hei r   1980’s peak 
l evel.   Stock pri ces begi n a rapid dow nfall  duri ng 1995,  culmi nat i ng i n t he bust s of 
1996 and 1997.  Si mi l arl y,  there is hardl y any evi dence of a dom esti c credit  boom  i n 
of  bl i nd  spot s,  sli ppery  surf aces;  mo r eover,   no  one  ensures  t hat   t hey  we r e  acquai nt ed  wi t h  t he  safety 
system s  t hey  coul d  i nst all   t o  avoi d  t hese  dangers.
11  In Thai l and a r eal  estate bubbl e wa s   an i m port ant  aspect  of  t he cri sis;  how ever,   a suff i cientl y l ong-r un
t i me   seri es  f or  propert y  pri ces  i s not   avail able. 
12  For   det ail s of  t hi s me t hod  see  De me t r i ades  and  Lui nt el  ( 1996,   1997).-7 -
Ko r ea i n  t he  1990s  –  i t   i s mu c h   mo r e of  a case of  a steady  r i se -   wh i l e t here i s evidence 
of  a coll apse i n  l ate 1997.     As   f ar  as Thai l and  i s concerned,   how ever,   t he  graphs  clearl y 
show  a boom  and bust  in st ock pri ces; how ever,  as in K orea, the col l apse of stock 
pri ces began as earl y as 1996.  The dom esti c credit  boom  i s m uch less evident ,
especiall y  wh e n   bank  credit   i s exam ined.     Tot al  credit ,   on  t he  ot her  hand,   exhi bi t s mo r e 
evidence of a lendi ng boom .   T his is consi stent wi t h t he w el l  know n fact that  that  in 
Thai l and i t  wa s  i nadequat ely regul ated fi nance com panies that  we r e the m ain cul pri t s 
f or  t he credit   boom  and excessive r i sky l endi ng,   i ncl udi ng subst anti al  exposure t o t he 
propert y ma r ket
13.     The  em pir i cal  analysi s i s,  t herefore,  carr i ed out   usi ng  bot h  a narr ow  
and  a broad  credit   vari able ( wh i ch i ncl udes  credit   by  f i nance  com panies).
Econom et ric Me t hodol ogy
The  em pir i cal  i nvest i gat i on i s carr i ed out   i n a V ector  Au t oregression ( VAR)   f r am ew ork,  
usi ng t he m axi mu m l i kel i hood approach of Johansen (1988) t o est i ma t e long-run
r elati onshi ps (coint egrati ng vect ors) bet w een the vari ables in quest i on.   T his techni que 
all ow s t he i dent i f i cati on of  mu l t i pl e l ong-run r elati onshi ps and i s an eff i cient  me t hod of 
t esti ng  causali t y  ( see Toda  and  Phi l l i ps  1993,   Ha l l   and  Wi ckens 1993  and  Ha l l   and  Mi l ne,  
1994).   The Johansen (1988) me t hod i s based on a vector err or corr ecti on (VECM)  
r epresentati on  of  a VAR( p)  m odel ,   wh i ch can be  wr i t t en as: 
?x t  =  G1  ?x t-1  +  G2?x t -2  +  . . . . . . . +  Gp- 1?x t-p+1  +  ?x t-p  +  ?Dt  +  u t   ( 1)
wh e r e x i s an   nx1 vector  of  t he f i r st  order  i nt egrated [ i . e.,   I ( 1)]   vari ables,  G 1, G2, . . . , Gp    are 
nxn m at r i ces of unknow n param eters, D i s a set of I( 0) det ermi ni sti c vari ables such as 
const ant,   t r end and d u mmi es,  and u i s a vector  of  norma l l y and i ndependent l y di str i but ed 
err ors wi t h  zero  m ean and  const ant  vari ance.    The  steady-state( equi l i bri um )  propert i es  of 
equat i on  ( 1)  are characteri zed by  t he  r ank  of  Π,   a square ma t r i x  of  size n.   The  existence of 
a coint egrati ng vect or i mp l i es that Π i s rank defi cient.  Johansen (1988) deri ves t he 
ma x i ma l   eigenval ue  and  t r ace stati sti c f or  t esti ng  t he  r ank  of  Π.If? i s of  r ank  r   ( 0<r<n)  
t hen  i t   can be  decom posed i nt o  t wo   ma t r i ces α  ( nxr)   and  β  ( nxr)such  t hat :  
Π=α β ′ ( 2)
The r ow s of ß are int erpreted as the di sti nct  coint egrati ng vect ors w hereby β′x f orm 
stati onary processes. The  α’ s are the err or corr ecti on coeff i cients w hich indi cate the
speeds of  adjust me n t   t ow ards  equi l i bri um .     Subst i t ut i ng  ( 2)  i nt o  ( 1)  we   get
?x t  =  G1  ?x t-1  +  G2?x t -2  +  . . . . . . . +  Gp- 1?x t-p+1  +  a  ( ß′x t-p)   +  ?Dt  +  u t          ( 3)
Thi s i s a basi c specif i cati on  f or  t he  t est  of  l ong-run  causali t y.     A  t est  of  zero  r estr i cti ons  on 
t he α’ s is a test of w eak exogenei t y w hen t he param eters of i nt erest are long-run
( Johansen and Jusel i us,  1992).   H all  and W i ckens (1993) and H al l  and M i l ne (1994) 
i nt erpret w eak exogenei t y i n a coint egrated system  as a noti on of long-run causali t y.
Thus,  w eak exogenei t y t ests are em ployed t o exam ine t he i ssue of long-run causali t y 
13  Al ba,   He r nandez and Kl i ngebi el  ( 1999)  provi de  a det ail ed docum ent ati on  of  t he  vul nerabil i t i es i n  t he 
Thai   f i nanci al  system ,  f ol l ow i ng  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   i ncl udi ng  t he  r ol e  of  t he  f i nance  com panies.-8 -
bet w een t he vari ables i n t he system .    The  nul l  of  a=0 i s t ested by t he standard l i kel i hood 
r ati o  t est.
Un i t   r oot   t ests ( not   r eport ed here)  suggest   t hat   all   vari ables are I ( 1).     The  vari ables are 
t herefore analysed usi ng Johansen’s (1988) coint egrati on analysi s. Tabl es 2 and 3
present the result s of thi s analysi s for Thai l and and Tabl e 4 presents the result s for 
Ko r ea.  W e  f i r st present and di scuss the result s on Thai l and,  wh i ch are m ore
str aight f orwa r d  t o  i nt erpret.
Thai l and
The  r esult s of  t he coint egrati on analysi s f or  Thai l and usi ng t he bank credit   v ari able are 
presented i n  Tabl e 2.     Pr e-testi ng  show ed  t hat   t he  f i nanci al  r estr aint s i ndex  wa s   w eakly 
exogenous t o t he system .    Thus,   t o i ncrease esti ma t i on eff i ciency t hi s vari able wa s   not  
m odel ed as endogenous i n t he VAR.     No t e also t hat   a cri sis d u mmy   i s also entered i n 
t he  VAR,   wh i ch t akes t he  val ue  1  f r om   1997Q 3  onw ards.       The  l ag l engt h  of  f our  i n  t he 
VAR  i s t he  mi ni mu m  l ag l engt h  t hat   ensures norma l i t y  and  absence of  seri al  corr elati on 
i n  t he  r esidual s.    The  t r ace stati sti c suggest s t he  presence of  t wo  coint egrati ng  vectors.
The  j oi nt   signi f i cance of  each of  t he f our  vari ables i n bot h vectors i s t ested by t he nul l  
t hat   bot h t he β  coeff i cients associated wi t h each vari able are zero.     Thi s hypot hesi s i s 
str ongl y rejected in al l  four cases, confi r mi ng t hat  all  four vari ables belong t o t he 
system .    Fol l ow i ng Pesar an and Shi n ( 1994),   over -ident i f yi ng r estr i cti ons are i m posed 
on t he coeff i cients of the coi nt egrati ng vect ors, wh i ch help t o m eaningful l y i nt erpret 
t hese vect ors.  Specif i call y,  it  is found t hat  the exclusi ons of (i )  bank credit  fr om  t he 
f i r st  vector  and  ( i i )   external   l i abil i t i es and  t he  f i nanci al  r estr aint s i ndex  f r om   t he  second 
vector  are accepted by t he dat a.    Consi deri ng t he val ues and stati sti cal  signi f i cance of 
t he l oadi ng factors, the fi r st  vector  i s norma l i zed on external   claims   and t he second on 
bank credit .   N ote, how ever,  that  the fi r st vector can also be norma l i zed on the st ock 
ma r ket   i ndex,   gi ven t hat   t he l att er  also show s evidence of  err or  corr ecti on wi t h r espect 
t o  t hi s vector.
The  f i r st  vector  depi cts a posi t i ve l ong-run r elati onshi p bet w een t he external   l i abil i t i es 
of Thai l and and her stock m arket  index;  bot h t hese vari ables are endogenous i n t hi s 
vector,  there is therefore feedback betw een them .   In t he sam e vect or the fi nanci al
r estr aint s i ndex  i s t he  onl y  exogenous  vari able.    Thus,   t he  i nt erpretati on  of  t hi s vector  i s 
str aight f orwa r d.     Gi ven t hat   t he f i nanci al  r estr aint s i ndex decli ned consi derably over  a 
r elati vel y short  peri od of ti me  i n t he l ate 1980s and earl y 1990s,  thi s suggest s that  
f i nanci al li berali zati on t r i ggered an upw ard cycle of capit al infl ow s and asset  pri ce 
r i ses.  T he relati onshi p survi ves t he cri sis peri od (subj ect to an i nt ercept shif t  in t he 
VAR)   but   i t   i s now  i n a dow nw ard spir al.     I nt eresti ngl y,   dom est i c bank credit   i s absent 
f r om  t hi s relati onshi p,  wh i ch seem s to suggest  that  capit al infl ow s found t hei r  wa y
di r ectl y  t o  t he  stock  ma r ket ,   wi t hout   bei ng  i nt erme d i ated by  t he  banki ng  system .
14
14 O ne qual i ficati on t hat  mu s t  be m ade here i s that  the bank credi t  vari able relates t o deposi t   m oney 
banks;   i t   i s we l l   know n  t hat   i n  Thai l and  f i nance  com panies  pl ayed  an  i m port ant  r ol e  i n  creati ng  a  l endi ng 
boom .       We   exam ine  a  broader  credit   aggregate  wh i ch  i ncl udes  l oans  by  f i nance  com panies  l ater.-9 -
Tabl e 2:  A sset  Pr i ces,  Lendi ng  Boom s  and  Fi nanci al   Li beral i zati on
Johansen  Coi nt egrati on  An a l ysi s f or  Thai l and:   1983Q 4-1998Q 4
Rank  of   coint egrati on  ma t rix  ( VAR  l ag l engt h  =  4)
Tr ace St ati sti c,      H0:   r ank  =  p




***,   **  and  *  i ndi cate stati sti cal  signi f i cance at  1% ,     5%   and  10%   ,   r especti vel y.
Vector  1
No r ma l i sed on  LEL   LP LC   FR
  Coe f f i cient -0. 236 0. 00 1. 453
  St andard  err or   0. 109 - 0. 245
Vector  2
No r ma l i sed on  LC   LEL LP   FR
  Coe f f i cient  0. 00 -0. 863     0. 00
  St andard  err or -   0. 023 -
Di agnost i cs:  p-values  i n  square parentheses
Tes t   of  over- i dent i f yi ng  r estr i cti ons:   chi - square ( 1)  =  0. 423  [ 0. 51]
V ector  autocorr elati on  t ests:  chi - square ( 9)  =  11. 118  [ 0. 27]
V ector  norma l i t y  t est:   chi - square ( 6):   7. 139  [ 0. 31]
We a k   Exogenei t y Test s
LEL LP LC
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  1 - 0. 111 -0. 511 -0. 011
t - val ue  2. 114   3. 173   0. 890
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  2 - 0. 333   0. 273 -0. 124
t - val ue  4. 939   1. 318   7. 972
The second vect or f or Thai l and depi cts a posi t i ve l ong-run relati onshi p bet w een
dom est i c bank credit  and st ock m arket  pri ces.  N o ot her vari able appears in t hi s
r elati onshi p.   M oreover,  the st ock m arket  index i s w eakly exogenous t o t he second 
vector.     Taken t oget her,   t he t wo   vectors suggest   t hat   t he dom est i c banki ng system  wa s  
a relati vel y i nnocent  f ol l ow er as far as the forma t i on of t he asset pri ce bubbl e is
concerned.     I t   appears t hat   i t   wa s   asset  pri ce r i ses wh i ch f uel l ed dom est i c bank credit  –
presum ably t hrough i ncreasing col l ateral val ues - and not  vi ce-versa.  Thus,  wh i l e
Thai l and seem s to fi t  t he cl assic credit  boom-bust  phenom enon,  t he coi nt egrati on
analysi s also suggest s som e i nt eresti ng  uni que  f eatures,  wh i ch are wo r t h  s u mma r i zing:
¾  The  eli mi nat i on  of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s set  i n  mo t i on  m echanism s t hat   l ed t o  t he  asset 
pri ce boom ;-10 -
¾  Ca pi t al  i nfl ow s r esult i ng f r om  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  f ound  t hei r   wa y   i nt o  t he  stock 
ma r ket   and  f uel l ed stock  pri ce i ncreases;
¾  A sset  pri ces r i ses encouraged mo r e capit al  i nfl ow s and i ncreased coll ateral  val ues,  
all ow i ng  dom est i c bank  credit   t o  expand;
¾  Do me s t i c bank  credit   wa s   not   r esponsi bl e f or  f uel l i ng  asset  pri ce r i ses but   ma y   have 
encouraged capit al  i nfl ow s  f urt her  ( t he  l att er  i s not   w eakly  exogenous  t o  t he  second 
vector) .
I t  is, how ever,  possibl e that  even though dom est i c bank credit  appears to be a fair l y 
i nnocent  fol l ow er of the l endi ng boom-bust  cycle, it  m ay have had short -term  eff ects 
on asset  pri ces.    I n order  t o i nvest i gat e t hi s possibi l i t y we   specif y a dynam i c m odel   f or 
asset  pri ces,  i ncl udi ng  l agged  f i r st  di f f erences of  t he  vari ables i n  t he  system  and  t he  l ag 
of the fi r st coint egrati ng vect or (CV1) .   The latt er is incl uded because the evi dence 
f r om   t he  l oadi ng  f actors suggest s t hat   t he  stock  ma r ket   i ndex  i s w eakly  exogenous  wi t h 
r espect to t he second vect or but  not  to t he fi r st.  We  t hen run a general -to-specif i c
search,  all ow i ng f or  up t o f our   l ags of  t he dynam i c t erms .     The  l att er  are m easured by 
t he f i r st  di f f erences of  t he ( l ogari t hm s of  t he)  stock ma r ket   i ndex,   dom est i c bank credit  
and external   l i abil i t i es.    I n t he general  specif i cati on we   also all ow  f or  a cri sis d u mmy .  
We   r eport   t he mo s t   parsim oni ous  m odel   bel ow   ( t -stati sti cs i n  parentheses):
D ynam i c M odel   f or  Thai   St ock M arket  I ndex:  1983Q 4-1998Q 4
∆l og(Pt)   = 1. 8834 –  0. 2288  CV1 t - 1 –  0. 3440 ∆l og  ( Pt - 1)–  1. 1176 ∆l og  ( ELt - 3)
( 3. 23)            ( 3. 12)                                ( 2. 57)       ( 3. 27)
R
2  =  0. 3301    Du r bi n- Wa t son  =  1. 9397 F(4, 52)  =  6. 1313    [ 0. 0003]
The esti ma t i on of the dynam i c m odel  confi r ms  t hat  dom est i c bank credit  w as not  a 
signi f i cant f actor i n fuel l i ng st ock m arket  pri ces even in t he short -run.  It  i s also
i nt eresti ng  t o  note t hat   t he  m odel   expl ains  33%   of  t he  vari ati on  of  stock  ma r ket   r eturns.
Gi ven t hat   t he l ags used are quart erl y,   t hi s all ow s am ple t i me   t o f orecast  f ut ure r eturns 
and act  on t hese f orecasts,  i ndi cati ng a f air l y i neff i cient  stock ma r ket .     Gi ven also t he 
f air l y l arge posi t i ve dri f t  t erm,  t hi s m odel  goes som e w ay i n expl aini ng t he
att r acti veness of  t he Thai   stock ma r ket   t o f oreign i nvest ors.    The  m odel   also i ndi cates 
w hy herdi ng behavi or m ay have been rati onal .   If  curr ent capit al infl ow s can hel p 
f oreign i nvest ors to predict fut ure returns i n t he Thai  stock m arket ,  it  is rati onal  for 
t hem  t o w at ch w hat every ot her foreign i nvest or is doi ng.   A  profi t -m aking  str ategy 
w oul d be ' buy Thai '   wh e n   everyone else i s also buyi ng and ' sell   Thai '   wh e n   ot hers are 
( or are about  to be) pul l i ng out ,  ir r especti ve of the underl yi ng fundam ent als.  M ore 
em pir i cal r esearch on t hi s issue using hi gher f r equency dat a is li kel y t o t hrow
addi t i onal  l i ght  on t he w ays i n w hi ch stock m arket  i neff i ciencies m ay encourage
herdi ng.
Gi ven t he apparent  ‘ i nnocence’  of  dom est i c bank credit   i n t he Thai   asset  pri ce boom  i t  
i s useful   t o  exam ine  wh e t her  a broader  dom est i c credit   vari able w oul d  di splay t he  sam e 
‘ i nnocence’.   The  Thai   f i nance  com panies i n  part i cular,   wh i ch we r e l argel y  unregulated, 
are w idel y t hought  to be responsi bl e for m any of the i l l s that  led to t he cri sis. It  is, -11 -
t herefore, useful  to t est thi s view  em pir i call y.   For thi s purpose,  we  c o l l ect dat a on
credit  by fi nance and securi t i es com panies and add i t  t o our dom est i c bank credit
vari able.    We   r epeat  t he  analysi s and  r eport   t he  new   set  of  r esult s i n  Tabl e 3.
Tabl e 3:A sset  Pr i ces,  Lendi ng  Boom s  and  Fi nanci al   Li beral i zati on
Broad  Do me s t i c Cr e di t   variabl e
Johansen  Coi nt egrati on  An a l ysi s f or  Thai l and:   1983Q 4-1998Q 4
Rank  of   coint egrati on  ma t rix  ( VAR  l ag l engt h  =  4)
Tr ace St ati sti c,      H0:   r ank  =  p




***,   **  and  *  i ndi cate  stati sti cal  signi f i cance  at  1% ,     5%   and  10%   ,   r especti vel y.
Vector  1
No r ma l i sed on  LEL   LP LCB   FR
  Coe f f i cient -0. 372 0. 00 1. 209
  St andard  err or   0. 109 - 0. 232
Vector  2
No r ma l i sed on  LCB   LEL LP   FR
  Coe f f i cient  0. 00 -0. 966     0. 00
  St andard  err or -   0. 029 -
Di agnost i cs:  p-values  i n  square parentheses
Tes t   of  over- i dent i f yi ng  r estr i cti ons:   chi - square ( 1)  =  0. 11  [ 0. 74]
V ector  autocorr elati on  t ests:  chi - square ( 9)  =  14. 609  [ 0. 10]
V ector  norma l i t y  t est:   chi - square ( 6):   11. 157  [ 0. 08]
We a k   Exogenei t y Test s
LEL LP LCB
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  1 - 0. 132 -0. 553 -0. 030
t - val ue  2. 216   3. 073   2. 214
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  2 - 0. 271   0.422 -0. 094
t - val ue  4. 053   2. 053   6. 174
The  analysi s cont i nues t o suggest   t he presence of  t wo   coint egrati ng vectors.    The  sam e 
r estr i cti ons as i n t able 2 are also accepted by t he dat a.  The two  n e w c o i nt egrati ng 
vectors do not  change qual i t ati vel y and are norma l i sed on t he sam e vari ables.
Ho we v e r ,   t here are i m port ant  changes i n t he signi f i cance of  t he l oadi ng f actors,  wh i ch 
det ermi ne l ong-run causal i t y i n t he system . In part i cular,  stock pri ces are no l onger 
w eakly exogenous w i t h respect to t he second v ector and credit  (broad) is not  w eakly 
exogenous t o t he f i r st  vector.       Thus,   broad credit   pl ays a mu c h   mo r e acti ve r ol e i n t he 
credit -asset  pri ce cycle t han  dom est i c bank  credit .   Specif i call y,   accordi ng  t o  t he  second -12 -
vector,  broad credit  exhi bi t s a long-run feedback relati onshi p w i t h t he st ock pri ce
i ndex.     Mo r eover,   i t   r esponds t o di sequi l i bri um  bet w een stock pri ces and capit al  f l ow s,  
i n eff ect support i ng st ock pri ce increases w hen capit al fl ow s fail  to do so.    These 
f i ndi ngs com bined wi t h t he r esult s of   Tabl e 2,   suggest   t hat   wh i l e dom est i c bank credit  
i n Thai l and pl ayed a l argel y passive r ol e i n t he credit -asset  pri ce r elati onshi p,   credit   by 
f i nance com panies appears to be have pl ayed a m uch m ore acti ve rol e in fuel l i ng t he 
asset  pri ce bubbl e.    Gi ven t hat   t he sam e r elati onshi p hol ds duri ng t he dow nw ard cycle, 
t hey al so suggest  t hat  t he cl osi ng dow n of a large num ber of fi nance com panies
f ol l ow i ng t he onset  of the cri sis, coul d onl y m agni f y t he bust ,  by exacerbat i ng t he 
ensuing  credit   crunch  ( I wa s a k i ,   1999).
Kor e a
The coint egrati on analysi s for Ko r ea proceeds along si mi l ar li nes as t hat  of Thai l and.
Ho we v e r ,   i t   i s now   possibl e t o  use  an addi t i onal   vari able ( r eal  GDP)   i n  t he  VAR,   wh i ch 
com pli cates the analysi s som ew hat.   Pr e-testi ng show s t hat  besi des t he fi nanci al
r estr aint s index,  external  li abil i t i es also is w eakly exogenous t o t he system .  In i t self  
t hi s r esult   alr eady  r epresents an i m port ant  di f f erence wi t h  t he  f i ndi ngs  f or  Thai l and,   f or 
wh i ch the sam e vari able exhibi t s a long-run feedback relati onshi p w i t h t he st ock
ma r ket   i ndex.
I n order t o i mp r ove est i ma t i on eff i ciency, we  t herefore m odel  t hese vari ables as
exogenous  i n  t he  VAR.     A  cri sis d u mmy   i s also all ow ed  t o  enter  t he  VAR;   t hi s d u mmy  
t akes the val ue 1 fr om  1997Q 3 onw ards.   The lag lengt h of fi ve i n t h e  VAR i s the 
mi ni mu m l ag lengt h t hat  ensures norma l i t y and absence of seri al corr elati on i n t he 
r esidual s.    The  t r ace stati sti c suggest s t he presence of  t wo   coint egrati ng vectors.    Pr e-
t esti ng show s t hat  none of t he vari ables can be excluded fr om  bot h coi nt egrati ng 
vectors.  Thus,  all  fi ve vari ables belong t o t he system .  O nce again w e i m pose over-
i dent i f yi ng  r estr i cti ons  on  t he  coeff i cients of  t he  coint egrati ng  vectors,  wh i ch hel p  us  t o 
m eaningful l y i nt erpret these vect ors.  Specif i call y,  we  f i nd t hat  exclusi on of (i )  real 
GDP  and f i nanci al  r estr aint s f r om  t he f i r st  vector  and ( i i )   stock ma r ket   i ndex f r om  t he 
second vect or i s accepted by t he dat a.  Consi deri ng t he val ues and st ati sti cal
signi f i cance of t he l oadi ng factors, w e norma l i ze the fi r st vector on dom est i c bank 
credit  and t he second on real GDP.   N ote, how ever,  that  the fi r st vector can also be 
norma l i zed on  t he  stock  ma r ket   i ndex,   gi ven  t hat   t he  l att er  also show s  evidence  of  err or 
corr ecti on  wi t h  r espect  t o  t hi s vector.
The f i r st vector depicts a posi t i ve l ong-run feedback relati onshi p bet w een dom esti c 
bank  credit   and  stock  ma r ket   pri ces.    Thi s r elati onshi p  i s aff ected by  external   l i abil i t i es, 
wh i ch enters exogenousl y.   It  is not  str aight f orwa r d t o i nt erpret thi s vector,  gi ven t he 
endogenei t y of bot h bank credit  and st ock m arket  pri ces. On e  i nt erpretati on i s that  
capit al  i nfl ow s  i nt o  Ko r ea f uel l ed t he  dom est i c credit   boom ,   wh i ch i n  t urn  f uel l ed stock 
ma r ket   pri ces,  generati ng  an asset  pri ce –  credit   boom   cycle.  Ho we v e r ,   str i ctl y  speaking 
t hi s int erpretati on i s not  val i d.   Fir stl y,  the dat a show  a credit  boom  but  not  an asset 
pri ce boom  (see Fi gure 2).     I n f act,   capit al  i nfl ow s t hem sel ves are negat i vel y r elated t o 
stock m arket  pri ces (t hi s is obvi ous i f  the vect or is norma l i sed on t he st ock pr i ce
i ndex).     Thi s i s not   surpri sing  gi ven  t hat   capit al  f l ow s  we r e on  a r i sing  t r end  wh e n   stock 
pri ces appear to be on a decl i ni ng t i me  t r end.   A lso, s t ock m arket  pri ces in K orea 
appeared to have boom ed i n t he m i d-l ate1980s,  fall i ng som ew hat  in t he earl y 1990s-13 -
and  r ecoveri ng  by  1994,   aft er  wh i ch t hey  we r e on  a decli ni ng  t r end.   On   t he  ot her  hand,  
capit al  i nfl ow s r ose steadil y f r om  t he earl y 1990s up unt i l   t he onset   of  t he cri sis,  as di d 
dom est i c credit .
Tabl e 4:A sset  Pr i ces,  Lendi ng  Boom s  and  Fi nanci al   Li beral i zati on
Johansen  Coi nt egrati on  An a l ysi s f or  Ko r ea:  1993Q 4-1998Q 4
Rank  of   coint egrati on  ma t rix  ( VAR  l ag l engt h  =  5)
Tr ace St ati sti c,      H0:   r ank  =  p




***,   **  and  *  i ndi cate stati sti cal  signi f i cance at  1% ,     5%   a nd  10%   ,   r especti vel y.
Vector  1
No r ma l i sed on  LC   LP LY LEL FR
  Coe f f i cient -0. 962 0. 00 -0. 761 0. 00
  St andard  err or   0. 065 -     0. 112 -
Vector  2
No r ma l i sed on  LY   LP LC LEL FR
  Coe f f i cient 0.00 -0. 818 0. 00 -0. 473
  St andard  err or -     0. 036 -     0. 075
Di agnost i cs:  p-values  i n  square parentheses
Tes t   of  over- i dent i f yi ng  r estr i cti ons:   chi - square ( 2)  =  0. 32  [ 0. 85]
V ector  autocorr elati on  t ests:  chi - square ( 9)  =  3. 19  [ 0. 96]
V ector  norma l i t y  t est:   chi - square ( 6):   4. 502  [ 0. 61]
We a k   Exogenei t y Test s
LP LC LY
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  1 0. 250 -0. 067 -0. 041
t - val ue 2. 203   2. 470   2. 016
Loadi ng  ( α)   of  vector  2 0. 828   0. 690 -0. 465
t - val ue 0. 689   2. 403   2. 160
The  second vector  depi cts a l ong-run posi t i ve f eedback r elati onshi p bet w een r eal  GDP 
and  dom est i c bank  credit .     Fi nanci al  r estr aint s –  a w eakly  exogenous  vari able - seem  t o 
have a posi t i ve eff ect  on r eal  GDP  and a negat i ve eff ect  on dom est i c bank credit ;   t hi s 
r esult   i s clearl y consi stent  wi t h t he analysi s of  econom i c grow t h presented i n secti on 2 
of  t he  paper.
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15  Fi nanci al  r estr aint s ma y   address excessive  risk-t aking  as we l l   as ol i gopol i sti c practi ces i n  t he  f i nanci al 
system .    The  f orme r   enhances  f i nanci al  stabil i t y  f ost eri ng  safe l ong- t erm  i nvest me n t s ( see St i gl i t z 1998;  -14 -
For   t he  sake of  com pleteness,  a dynam i c m odel   of  stock  ma r ket   pri ces i s also esti ma t ed 
f or  Ko r ea.    The  r esult s are presented bel ow .
D ynam i c M odel   f or  Korean  St ock M arket  I ndex:  1983Q 4-1998Q 4
∆l og(Pt)   =- 2 . 52  +  0. 18  CV1 t - 1  +  1. 14  ∆(F R t - 1)   +  0. 41  ∆l og  (E Lt - 1)-   0. 58  ∆l og  ( ELt - 2)-   0. 95  ∆l og  ( ELt - 3)
        ( 2. 33)    ( 2. 38)                            ( 1. 92)                              ( 2. 45)                                          ( 3. 58)                                          ( 5. 84) 
–  0. 15  cri sis d u mmy  
( 1. 90)
R
2  =  0. 5424    Du r bi n- Wa t son  =  1. 5982 F(4, 52)  =  9. 6245    [ 0. 0000]
These fi ndi ngs confi r m t he negat i ve l ong-run relati onshi p bet w een external  li abil i t i es 
and st ock m arket  pri ces.  T he relati onshi p has an i nverse-J shape, how ever.   Ini t i all y 
capit al infl ow s raise stock m arket  returns,  wi t h a l ag of one quart er,  but  then reduce
t hem .     I t   i s also i nt eresti ng t o not e t hat   t he f i nanci al  r estr aint s i ndex enters posi t i vel y,  
suggest i ng  t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali zati on  r educed stock  ma r ket   r eturns.     Fi nal l y,   t he  m odel  
expl ains mo r e t han 54%  of  t he vari ati on i n stock ma r ket   r eturns,  indi cati ng  subst anti al 
i neff i ciencies in t he K orean stock m arket .   These ineff i ciencies m ay, once again,
expl ain  bot h  t he  att r acti veness  of  t he  ma r ket   f or  f oreign  i nvest ors as we l l   as t he  herdi ng 
behavi our  t hat   wa s   observed  duri ng  t he  cri sis. 
Anal ysis of  Empi rical  Fi ndi ngs 
The f i ndi ngs presented in t hi s secti on suggest  that  Thai l and fi t s the credit  and asset  
pri ce boom-bust   phenom enon r elati vel y we l l .   Fi nanci al  l i berali zati on t r i ggered capit al 
f l ow s i nt o Thai l and,   wh i ch f uel l ed an asset  pri ce – capit al  f l ow s cycle.    Do me s t i c bank 
credit  fol l ow ed asset pri ce ri ses w hil e credit  by fi nance and securi t i es com panies
pl ayed a mo r e acti ve r ol e,  propagat i ng t he vi cious upw ard cycle.  Wh e n   capit al  i nfl ow s 
began t o dry up i n 1995,  asset pri ces reached a plateau and then em barked on a 
decli ni ng course.    A  short -li ved surge i n bot h credit   and capit al  i nfl ow s duri ng t he f i r st 
hal f  of 1997,  w as not  suff i cient to prevent the fr ee fall  of stock pri ces, but  m ay have 
been behi nd  a short -li ved  bl i p  l ater  t hat   year.
The  Ko r ean cri sis appears not   t o f i t   t he asset–credit   boom-bust   cycle very we l l .     Wh i l e 
dom est i c credit  and st ock pri ces exhibi t  a posi t i ve feedback relati onshi p,  there is not  
mu c h   evidence  of  an asset  pri ce boom   i n  t he  dat a.    Fur t hermo r e,  capit al  i nfl ow s  di d  not  
pl ay the sam e rol e as in Thai l and.   If  anyt hi ng,  t here is evidence of a negat i ve
r elati onshi p bet w een external  l i abil i t i es and asset pri ces.  If  one adds t o t hi s the
r elati vel y heal t hy m acroeconom i c fundam ent als of the K orean econom y pri or to t he 
cri sis, the Ko r ean cri sis appears almo s t   i nexpl i cable,  l endi ng credence t o t he f i nanci al 
pani c vi ew  ( Chang and Ve l asco,  1998;   Ra de l et  and Sachs,  1998).  
16  Ther e are enough 
we l l  know n facts that  are consistent wi t h t hi s view .  Im port antl y,  capit al infl ow s i nt o 
Ko r ea w ere accom panied by a com parable expansi on of  f oreign assets.  Ho we v e r ,   t hese 
f oreign asset s w ere of dubi ous qual i t y.   A necdot al evidence suggest s they i ncl uded 
De me t r i ades,  1998).     The  l att er  has i mp l i cati ons f or  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   and t he  vol um e  of  i nvest me n t  
( Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades,  1997).  
16 For  a m ore detail ed exposi t i on and anal ysi s of t he K orean m acroeconom i c fundam ent als see
De me t r i ades  and  Fat t ouh  ( 1999).  -15 -
l endi ng  t o  I ndonesi a and  R ussian j unk  bonds  ( Chot e,  1998).   Fur t hermo r e,  wh i l e capit al 
i nfl ow s w ere of short -term n a t ure, t he assets that  we r e acquir ed had m uch l onger
ma t uri t i es.  Thi s m aturi t y m i s-m atch w as a sym ptom  of a m uch w ider w eakness,
nam el y t he i nadequat e m anagem ent  of fi nanci al ri sk (i . e. exchange ri sk, credit  ri sk, 
i nt erest rate ri sk, l i qui di t y ri sk) by K orean fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons and ot her Ko r ean
corporati ons.  The bui l t -up of l arge am ount s of f oreign l i abil i t i es coupl ed w it h
i nadequat e m anagem ent   of  f i nanci al  r i sks ma d e   t he Ko r ean econom y vul nerable t o t he 
senti me n t s of foreign l enders. Wh e n  f oreign l enders becam e concerned about  these 
w eaknesses and  consequent l y  decided  not   t o  r enew  or  r ol l over  t hei r   l oans  t o  Ko r ea,  t hi s 
wa s   t antam ount   t o a bank-run on t he Ko r ean econom y.     The  coll apse of  t he W on t hat  
f ol l ow ed i ncreased the burden of dol l ar-denom i nat ed debt s, forcing even vi able fi r ms  
i nt o  i nsol vency,   f urt her  wo r sening  t he  qual i t y  of  banki ng  system  assets. 
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Tr adit i onal   econom i c analysi s suggest s t hat   a bank  pani c can be  prevented i f   t here i s an 
eff ecti ve l ender  of  l ast  r esort .     Ho we v e r ,   t he Bank of  Ko r ea’s abil i t y t o act  as a l ender 
of  l ast  r esort   wa s   eroded  by  t he  presence of  m assive  am ount s of  assets and  l i abil i t i es i n 
f oreign curr ency in t he dom est i c fi nanci al system .  The Bank of Ko r ea can not,  by
defi ni t i on,   suppl y i nfi ni t e am ount s  of U S dol l ars.  It s abil i t y t o act  as a provi der of 
dol l ar-li qui di t y i s l i mi t ed by i t s f oreign exchange r eserves.     Thi s expl ains w hy f oreign 
l enders pai d  a l ot   of  att enti on  t o  t he  f oreign  exchange posi t i on  of  Ko r ea –  and  w hy  bad 
new s  about   t hi s key  vari able coul d  t r i gger  a pani c.    Mo r eover,   t hi s i s also precisely  w hy 
wh e n   t he  agreem ent  wi t h  t he  I MF   wa s   r eached f oreign  l enders we r e l ess i ncl i ned  t o  r un 
i n  t he  know l edge  t hat   t he  I MF   wa s   i n  essence assum ing  t he  r ol e of  l ender  of  l ast  r esort .
A  simi l ar  argum ent   can be  ma d e   f or  t he  case of  Thai l and,   even t hough  t he  source of  t he 
vul nerabil i t i es in t he fi nanci al system  w as of a dif f erent nat ure.  The bursti ng of the 
stock ma r ket   ( and propert y)  bubbl e and t he slow dow n of  capit al  f l ow s created grow i ng 
w eaknesses i n  t he  bal ance sheets of  Thai   f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  and  served  t o  undermi ne 
t he credibi l i t y of the curr ency peg, all  of wh i ch result ed in l oss of confi dence i n t he 
Thai  econom y.   This led to an abrupt  reversal of capit al fl ow s,  wh i ch w as ini t i all y 
count eracted by t he Bank of Thai l and’s att em pts to defend t he curr ency.  Ho we v e r ,  
soon aft erwa r ds foreign exchange reserves w ere depl eted, r esult i ng i n a sharp
depreciati on  of  t he  Thai   Ba ht .     Toget her  wi t h  t he  hi gh  i nt erest  r ates t hat   we r e ut i l i sed t o 
defend t he curr ency,  t hi s exacerbat ed t he bust   f urt her,   undermi ni ng any prospect s of  a 
qui ck r ecovery.     The  vi cious dow nw ard cycle and t i ght   l i qui di t y condi t i ons com pell ed 
di str essed fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons t o call  i n t hei r  l oans,  f orcing i l l i qui d but  vi able
com panies i nt o i nsol vency.
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Ther e w ere, therefore, elem ents of a self -ful f i l l i ng bank pani c in bot h cases, wh i ch
am pli f i ed the consequences of t he vul nerabil i t i es present i n each count r y.   The
vul nerabil i t i es i n  Thai l and  we r e clearl y  mo r e vi sibl e mu c h   earl i er  ( t here  wa s   t alk  of  t he 
propert y bubbl e i n t he we s t ern press,  f or  exam ple The Econom i st,   we l l   before i t   burst)  
wh i ch ma y   expl ain w hy Thai l and wa s   t arget ed f i r st.     The  vul nerabil i t i es i n Ko r ea we r e 
we l l   hi dden  i n  t he  bal ance sheets of  banks  and  ot her  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons–  i t   t ook mo r e 
t i me  f or them  t o surf ace.  Ho we v e r ,  even if  there w ere no real w eaknesses in t he 
17 The t i ght  m onet ary pol i cy that  wa s  i mp l em ented aft er the onset  of the cr i sis i n order  t o stabil i ze t he 
exchange rate exacerbat ed the bust  even furt her by hi t t i ng sm al l  and m edi um  ent erpri ses through t he 
credit   channel  ( D om aç and  Fer r i ,   1998).  
18  For   a  vi vi d  descri pt i on  of  t he  dynam i cs  of  t he  Thai   cri sis see  I wa s a k i   ( 1999).-16 -
f i nanci al system , a pani c by foreign l enders coul d st i l l  tr i gger a cri sis, if  there is no 
eff ecti ve  l ender  of  l ast  r esort .     The  very  nat ure of  banki ng  entail s ma t uri t y-m ism atches.
Af t er  all ,   ma t uri t y t r ansforma t i on i s one of  t he mo s t   f undam ent al  f unct i ons t hat   banks 
perf orm,   t ypi call y  borr ow i ng  short   and  l endi ng  l ong.     By  t hem sel ves,   t he  ma t uri t y  mi s-
ma t ches present  i n Thai   and Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t uti ons di d not   r epresent  a source of 
vul nerabil i t y.  Ho we v e r ,  w hen com bined w i t h curr ency exposures they created fert i l e 
ground for self -ful f i l l i ng bank pani cs,  precisely because of  t he absence of  an eff ecti ve 
i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort .     A  bank  r un  can f orce a solvent   but   i l l i qui d  bank  i nt o 
i nsol vency,   as i t   i s very costl y t o l i qui dat e assets wi t h l ong ma t uri t i es.    As   t he f orced 
sale value of assets is m uch low er than t he ful l  ma r ket  val ue,  a rum our that  a bank' s 
assets are of  poor  qual i t y  ma y   we l l   t urn  out   t o  be  self -ful f i l l i ng,   part i cularl y  i f   t he  bank 
i s unabl e t o r aise suff i cient  am ount s of  l i qui di t y i n t he m oney ma r ket s.    I n such cases 
i l l i qui d but   solvent   banks usual l y r esort   t o borr ow i ng f r om  t he centr al  bank,   w ho wi l l  
t hen act  as a l ender  of last  r esort .     I n norma l   cir cum stances,  t he me r e know l edge t hat  
t here i s a l ender  of  l ast  r esort   i n t he system  prevents bank r uns f r om  occurr i ng i n t he 
f i r st pl ace, rul i ng out  the possi bi l i t y of self -ful f i l l i ng bank pani cs. In bot h K orea and 
Thai l and,   how ever,   t he  excessive  dependence  of  t he  f i nanci al  system  on  dol l ar  l i qui di t y 
eroded t he abi l i t y of dom est i c centr al banks t o carr y out  thi s vit al stabil i t y enhanci ng 
f unct i on.     Thi s vul nerabil i t y wa s   f urt her  enhanced by t he dependence of  t he exchange 
rate on v ol ati l e capit al fl ow s.   A  capit al out f l ow  exert s dow nw ard pressure on t he 
curr ency.  I f   deval uat i on can not   be avoi ded,   ot herwi se sound dom est i c borr ow ers ma y  
becom e insol vent  because of thei r  increased debt burden,  part i cularl y i f  they di d not  
hedge agai nst  unfavourable exchange rate m ovem ent s. Thus,  a rum our concerni ng
‘ bad-l endi ng’  practi ces coul d  becom e self -ful f i l l i ng.
I n concl usi on,  wh i l e inadequat e m anagem ent  of r i sks created fert i l e ground for
f i nanci al pani c, by m aki ng foreign i nvest ors nervous,  the stam pede coul d have been 
avoi ded had t here been an eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort .     I n i t s absence, 
bel i efs about  bad-l endi ng practi ces becam e self -ful f i l l i ng,  r esult i ng not  onl y i n a
l i qui di t y crunch but ,  also, the col l apse of exchange r ates, wh i ch furt her reduced the 
qual i t y of assets of fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons.   M oreover,  t he at t em pts to st abil i ze the
curr encies usi ng  t i ght   m onet ary  pol i cy com pounded  t hese  probl em s,  f eeding  t he  vi cious 
dow nw ard  cycle,  f urt her  exacerbat i ng  t he  bust .  
4.Pol i cy  Issues
Thi s secti on draw s out  som e pol i cy lessons fr om  t he cri sis in Thai l and and K orea, in 
t he  l i ght   of  t he  analysi s presented so f ar.
Mo r a l   H azard and  O ver-Lendi ng
Ther e i s no doubt   t hat   borr ow ers i ncl udi ng f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ari es di d not   adequately
cover them sel ves against  unfavorable exchange rate m ovem ent s and ot her fi nanci al 
r i sks.    Wh a t   i s debat able,  how ever,   i s wh e t her  t hi s wa s   i nt enti onal   behavi or.   A  popul ar 
vi ew  i s t hat   f i r ms ,   banks and ot her  ma r ket   part i cipant s del i berately t ook on hi gh l evels
of r i sk, because of i mp l i cit l y or expl i cit l y provi ded safety net s (by t he dom est i c
governm ent s or t he IMF  i n t he case of f oreign l enders) – a classic case of over-
borr ow i ng  due  t o  mo r al  hazard  behavi or  ( Mc Ki nnon  and  Pi l l ,   1997).-17 -
Wh i l e the m oral hazard argum ent  appears qui t e pow erf ul ,  it  nevert hel ess does not  fi t  
t he  Ko r ean and  Thai   experi ences very  we l l
19.     To  start   wi t h,   t he  safety  net s appeared t o 
have had m any hol es in t hem ;  m any of those w ho w oul d be hopi ng t o be rescued by 
t hem  i n fact fell  through t hem .     I n Ko r ea bank sharehol ders we r e almo s t   t ot all y wi ped 
out ,  wh i l e m any bank m anagers and t r oubl ed chaebol executi ves found t hem sel ves 
wi t hout  a job.   Even the governm ent  it self  found i t self  out  of off i ce soon aft er the 
cri sis!    Thus,   i f   one  accepts t he  mo r al  hazard  argum ent   t hen  one  mu s t   also accept  a f air  
am ount  of i mp e r f ect f oresight  or i r r ati onal i t y.   Th i s w oul d of course indi cate
i nconsi stent (or even schizophrenic) behavi or.  O ne aspect of thei r  behavi or suggest s 
t hat  we r e ult r a-rati onal ,  greedil y w orki ng out  how  t o expl oi t  safety net s to t hei r
advant age,  wh i l e anot her  i ndi cates t hat   t hey  we r e unabl e t o  f i gure out   t hat   t hi s behavi or 
by  t hem sel ves  and  ot hers w oul d  l ead t o  t he  coll apse of  t he  safety  net s.
Fur t hermo r e, t he si gni f i cant social sti gm a att ached to t hose found responsi bl e for
com pany fail ures (wh i ch as a cult ural factor mu s t  have been ant i cipat ed),  is a factor 
t hat   surely mu s t   have di scouraged dom est i c corporati ons f r om  gam bl i ng t hei r   f ort unes 
i n  t he  wa y   envi sioned  by  t he  mo r al  hazard  argum ent .
These argum ent s do not   appl y t o t he sam e extent  t o f oreign l enders and i nvest ors w ho 
we r e hardl y ‘ sham ed’  by t hei r   f ail ures and w ho at  t he sam e t i me   appear  t o have borne 
t he sm all est  port i on of  t he burden.     Fur t hermo r e,  i t   i s now  evident   t hat   f oreign l enders 
i ncorr ectl y assum ed t hat  As i an corporati ons w oul d be bai l ed out  by t hei r  respecti ve 
governm ent s, wh i ch led them  t o under -pri ce credit  ri sks (Bont e, 1999).   The good 
m acroeconom i c fundam ent als and prospect s of Eas t  As i an econom i es, toget her wi t h
t hi s t ype  of  mo r al  hazard,   go  som e wa y   i n  expl aini ng  t he  wi l l i ngness  of  f oreign  l enders 
and i nvest ors to suppl y m assive am ount s of capit al to t hem .   In conl usi on,  wh i l e the 
mo r al hazard argum ent  m ay go som e w ay i n expl aini ng t he ‘over-lendi ng’ syndrom e,
on  close  i nspect i on  i t   i s not   very  good  at  expl aini ng  t he  ‘ over -borr ow i ng’  syndrom e.
I nvestor  Euphori a 
The above anal ysi s raises an im port ant quest i on.   I f  t he excessive ri sk-taking of
dom est i c m arket  part i cipant s w as not a consequence of mo r al hazard behavi or,  wh a t  
wa s  i t  ma i n cause?  The answ er has t o be t hat  they genui nel y under -esti ma t ed r i sks.
Ther e are a num ber  of  r easons w hy  t hi s ma y   have  been t he  case.    The  over-opt i mi sm  of 
f oreign l enders and i nt ernat i onal  organi zati ons concerni ng t he prospects of t hese
econom i es encouraged dom esti c part i cipant s to be euphori c them sel ves.  To t hi s, one 
mu s t   add t he euphori a generated by f i nanci al  l i berali zati on i t self ,   wh i ch cont r i but ed t o 
t he boom i ng asset  ma r ket s,  wh i ch i n t urn r educed t he perceived r i sks by bot h f i nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons and dom est i c i nvest ors
20.     Thus,   i f   t here i s a pol i cy l esson t o be l earned,   i t  
mu s t   be t hat   m easures t hat   curb t he euphori a of  ma r ket   part i cipant s coul d be useful   i n 
19  See  also Chang  (1999).
20  An   i m port ant  curr ent  exam ple of  t he  r elevance of  t he  need t o  com bat  excessive  euphori a and  t he  need 
t o educat e m arket part i cipant s is that  of Cyprus.   M any fi nanci al analyst s and t he central bank have 
l abeled t he  existi ng  f i nanci al  restraint s–  under  wh i ch t he  count r y  m anaged  t o  grow   at  approx.   7%   p. a. 
f or thi r t y years - an ‘anachroni sm ’,  gl am ouri ze fi nanci al li berali zati on and fail  to acknow l edge any 
i ncreased ri sks.  In expect ati on of the openi ng of fi nanci al ma r ket s, the st ock m arket  index rose by 
approxi ma t ely 700%  duri ng 1999;  analyst s are encouraging m arket  part i cipant s to ‘arbi t r age’ by
borr ow i ng  i n  euros  ( t he  exchange  r ate  i s pegged  t o  t he  euro)  and  i nvest   i n  t he  stock  ma r ket .-18 -
wo r ki ng against  t he creati on of asset pri ce bubbl es.  I n i t self ,  educati ng m arket
part i cipant s about   t he r i sks associated wi t h f i nanci al  l i berali zati on,   as di scussed bel ow ,  
ma y   go  som e wa y   i n  t em peri ng  excessive  euphori a.
Tensi ons  Bet w een Exchange  Rat e Pol i cy and  Prudent i al   Regul at i on
An   addi t i onal   r eason w hy ma r ket  part i cipant s m ay have under-esti ma t ed exchange r i sk 
wa s  t he pol i cy of ma i nt aini ng a pegged exchange rate.  A  credibl e pegged exchange 
r ate r egime   r equi r es f r om  t i me   t o t i me   announcem ent s by t he centr al  bank and/ or  ot her 
signal i ng t hat   t he peg i s sustai nabl e.    These announcem ent s and signal s ma y   ‘ com fort ’  
ma r ket  part i cipant s excessivel y,  encouraging t hem  t o di scount  t he prospect  of
deval uat i on.     Pr udent i al  r egul ati on  and  supervi sion  shoul d,   nevert hel ess,  t r y  t o  count er-
act these t endenci es, ensuri ng t hat  ma r ket  part i cipant s understand and m anage ri sks 
adequately.     Ho we v e r ,   as i s f r equent l y  t he  case i n  m any  devel opi ng  count r i es,  t he  sam e 
i nst i t ut i on -  t he  centr al  bank  - has  r esponsi bi l i t y  f or  bot h  pol i cies.    Thi s creates t ension 
bet w een t hem .     I f   t he central  bank em phasi zes t he need t o hedge against   unfavourable 
exchange r ate m ovem ent s,  t hi s ma y   be perceived as a signal   t hat   a deval uat i on ma y   be 
i mmi nent ,   wh i ch i s l i kel y t o undermi ne i t s abil i t y t o del i ver  exchange r ate stabil i t y.     I f  
on t he ot her hand,  the credibi l i t y of the exchange rate peg i s cont i nual l y em phasi zed, 
s o me  ma r ket  part i cipant s are li kel y t o under-esti ma t e exchange r i sk and choose not   t o 
cover  t hei r   f oreign  exchange exposures.
I f   t hi s hypot hesi s i s corr ect - f urt her  r esearch on t hi s wo u l d be useful - t hen  t he  t ension 
can to som e ext ent be eased by creati ng a separate governm ent  agency for prudent i al 
r egul ati on  t hat   i s i ndependent   f r om   t he  centr al  bank.     Thi s w oul d  all ow   mo r e degrees of 
f r eedom  for bot h t he supervi sory aut hori t y and t he cent r al bank.   If  the supervi sory 
agency is independent  fr om  t he centr al bank,  i t  wi l l  be bet t er able to ensure that
exchange ri sk is adequately m anaged w i t hout  havi ng t o be concerned w het her i t s
eff ort s w oul d  be  f uel l i ng  t he  suspicion  of  an i mmi nent   deval uat i on.   I n  i t self ,   t hi s w oul d 
enhance  t he  abil i t y  of  t he  centr al  bank  t o  del i ver  a stable exchange r ate.
Prudent i al   Regul at i on,   Account i ng  St andards  and  I nf orm at i on  Di sclosure 
On e   i m port ant  m echanism  f or  addressing excessive r i sk t aking i n t he f i nanci al  system , 
wh a t ever it s source, is of course prudent i al regul ati on and supervi sion of fi nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons.   Th e r e is w idespread recogni t i on am ong econom i sts and fi nanci al
practi t i oners that  one of the m ost  im port ant lessons t hat  has em erged fr om  t he East
As i an fi nanci al cri sis is that  t he prudent i al regul ati on and supervi sion of fi nanci al
i nt erme d i ari es need to be st r engt hened before capit al account  li berali zati on.
21  Wh i l e 
hardl y  anyone  w oul d  di sagree wi t h  t hi s broad  concl usi on,   i t   i s also not   di f f i cult   t o  argue 
t hat   i t   i s t oo  general  t o  be  of  mu c h   use  i n  hel pi ng  t o  prevent  f ut ure cri ses.    Af t er  all ,   i t   i s 
almo s t  t autol ogi cal t o ascri be a fi nanci al cri sis to som e w eakness i n prudent i al
r egul ati on.  Wi t h t he benefi t  of hi ndsi ght ,  there is almo s t  alwa y s  s o me t hi ng t hat  the 
r egul ator coul d have done t hat  w oul d have prevented a cri sis. Wh i l e draw ing out  the 
specif i c l essons of  t he As i an cri sis f or  prudent i al  r egul ati on and supervi sion i s l i kel y t o 
be a very useful  exercise, it  wi l l  cert ainl y not  guarantee that  future cri ses w ould be 
21  Thi s r ecogni t i on  i s,  of  course,  not   a new   one. W orl d  Bank  ( 1989)  and  t he  sequenci ng  l i t erature ( e.g.  
Mc Ki nnon,  1991) argue forcibl y about  the need t o i mp r ove banki ng regul ati on and supervi sion before 
f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.-19 -
prevented.
22 I t  i s therefore im port ant t o recogni se that  str engt heni ng prudent i al
r egul ati on and supervi sion,  we l com e though i t  m ay be,  has l i mi t ati ons.   Aft er all
r egul ators and bank supervi sors are publ i c sector em ployees w it h i mp e r f ect   f oresight  
wo r ki ng  under  condi t i ons  of  i mp e r f ect  i nforma t i on
23.
I mp r ovi ng account i ng st andards and i nforma t i on di sclosure, wh i ch seem s to be an
addi t i onal  l esson fr om  t he A si an cri sis w oul d hel p bot h regul ators and m arket
part i cipant s to recogni ze ri sks suff i cientl y earl y.   Ho we v e r ,  it  is again i m port ant to 
r ecogni se t hat   i mp e r f ect  i nforma t i on  i s i nherent  i n  f i nanci al  t r ansacti ons  and  no  am ount  
of  l egislati on i s l i kel y t o f ul l y address t hi s i mp e r f ecti on.
Ri sk M anagem ent   Syst em s and  Trai ni ng
A mo r e generi c approach, wh i ch w oul d cert ainl y com pl em ent bet t er prudent i al
r egul ati on and account i ng st andards,  invol ves t he overhaul  of the ri sk m anagem ent  
capabil i t i es of fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons i n em ergi ng m arket  econom i es.  This does not  
me r ely com pri se t he upgrading of  r i sk m anagem ent   system s,  wh i ch i s oft en one of  t he 
obj ecti ves of prudent i al r egul ati on and supervi sion.   I m port antl y,  i t  r equi r es the
r ecogni t i on and appreciati on of t he i ncreased ri sks that  em anate fr om  fi nanci al
l i berali zati on,  incl udi ng exchange ri sk, credit  ri sk, li qui di t y ri sk, int erest rate ri sk etc, 
not   onl y  by  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  and  r egul ators but   also by  all   ot her  ma r ket   part i cipant s 
( i ncl udi ng  analyst s and  f i nanci al  j ournal i sts).
24  Thi s shoul d  i ncl ude  an understanding  of 
r elati vel y new  concept s in econom i cs, incl udi ng t he rol e of imp e r f ect informa t i on i n 
f i nanci al ma r ket s
25,  recent devel opm ent s in fi nanci al ma r ket s, the rol e of deri vat i ves 
and hedgi ng i nst r um ent s, as w ell  as the l i mi t ati ons of f i nanci al m odel l i ng.   Thi s
analysi s w oul d al l ow  a bet t er appreciati on of w hy i nforma t i on related probl em s are 
aggravated wh e n   i nt erest  r ates i ncrease,  wh i ch usual l y f ol l ow s f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.
Ho we v e r ,  mo r e and bet t er (up-t o-dat e) t r aini ng can not  off er f ul l  prot ecti on fr om
com plex f i nanci al  r i sks,  even i f   i t   all ow s t he i mp l em entati on of  sophi sti cated hedgi ng 
str ategies.  As   t he exam ple of  LTCM   dem onst r ated,  f i nanci al  ‘ engi neeri ng’  i s based on 
assum pti ons t hat  are not  alw ays val i d;  t he i m port ance of i t s li mi t ati ons m ust  be
r ecogni sed.
22  Thi s i s very  mu c h   l i ke  addressing  t he  causes of  an air - crash wh i ch ma y   all ow  t he  str engt heni ng  of  air -
safety regul ati ons t o prevent simi l ar crashes fr om  happeni ng i n t he fut ure; how ever,  di f f erent types of 
f ail ures  coul d  occur  i n  t he  f ut ure.
23  For   exam ple,  i t   i s now   r ecogni zed t hat   t he  8%   r i sk-we i ght ed capit al  adequacy r equi r ement   ma y   not   be 
suff i cient  f or  banks  i n  devel opi ng  or  t r ansit i on  econom i es.    The  Ba s e l   Co mmi t t ee Wo r ki ng  Gr oup  on  t he 
l essons t o be draw n fr om  t he A si an C ri sis is therefore suggest i ng t hat  “… at the l evel of the i ndi vi dual  
bank,   capit al  r equi r em ents can be t ail ored t o  t he  nat ure and  extent  of  t he  r i sks f aced by  t he  i nst i t ut i on”,  
r ecogni zing  t hat   “Such  a di screti onary  approach… .pl aces a prem ium   on  t he  i ndependence  and  skil l s of 
supervi sors.”  Bont e  ( 1999)  p.   39.
24The f i nanci al l i berali zati on l i t erature has all  t oo oft en over - em phasi zed the pot enti al benefi t s of
f i nanci al l i berali zati on w i t hout  acknow l edgi ng t he ri sks and dangers fr om  i t  ( see A resti s and
De me t r i ades,  1999).  
25  Af t er  all   m any  credit   off i cers,  bank  supervi sors and  centr al  bank  governors we r e educat ed before t he 
econom i cs of  i nforma t i on  r evol ut i on.-20 -
I nt ernat i onal   l ender  of   Last   R esort
On e   of  t he  mo s t   i m port ant  i mp l i cati ons  of  t he  analysi s presented i n  t he  previous  secti on 
i s that  the absence of an eff ecti ve l ender of last resort  at the very l east am pli f i ed the 
m agni t ude of the cri sis. Suppose for a  mo me n t  that  such an i nst i t ut i on exi sted.  B y
provi di ng suff i cient am ount s of dol l ar-li qui di t y t o count r i es facing t he refusal  of
f oreign  l enders t o  r ol l -over  l oans  and/ or  t he  abrupt   r eversal  of  capit al  i nfl ow s,   exchange 
r ates w oul d not  have col l apsed to t he ext ent they di d and t here w oul d have been l ess 
need for t he i nvest ors to run.   M any ent erpri ses that  f ail ed w oul d have rem ained
solvent ,  except perhaps for those w hi ch w ere unprofi t able to st art  wi t h.   Thus,  we  
w oul d  have  seen a m odest   r ecession  i nst ead of  a f ul l -blown  cri sis. 
The conti nued absence of an eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal  lender of last resort  clearl y poses 
cont i nued  t hreats f or  t he  f ut ure stabil i t y  of  t he  i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  system ,  especiall y 
i f   capit al  f l ow s cont i nue t o m ove around t he gl obe uni nhi bi t ed.  Cr i t i cs of  t he need f or 
an int ernat i onal  lender of last resort  argue t hat  there w oul d be seri ous m oral hazard 
associated wi t h  such an i nst i t ut i on.     Ther e i s no  doubt   t hat   t here i s consi derable me r i t   i n 
t hi s cri t i cism . Ho we v e r ,  mo r al hazard i s a second-order probl em  w hen com pared to 
f i nanci al  i nst abil i t y i n t he f orm  of  f r equent   self -ful f i l l i ng bank r uns.   I f   t hi s wa s   not   t he 
case, laissez-fair e banki ng w i t hout  centr al banks w oul d al r eady have prevail ed.  It  is 
evident l y  mu c h  mo r e chall engi ng t o address the m oral hazard probl em  at t he
i nt ernat i onal  as opposed t o t he nat i onal  l evel.   The  mos t  obvi ous i nt ernat i onal
i nst i t ut i on  t o  carr y  out   l ender  of  l ast  r esort   operati ons  at  an i nt ernat i onal   l evel  i s clearl y 
t he I MF .     Ho we v e r ,   t he I MF ' s abil i t y t o r aise dol l ar li qui di t y i s l i mi t ed,  i n cont r ast  t o 
t he abi l i t y of nat i onal  centr al banks t o pri nt  unl i mi t ed am ount s of t he dom est i c
curr ency.    Fur t hermo r e,  nat i onal   centr al  banks are able t o address t he mo r al  hazard of 
t hese operati ons by i m posi ng draconi an m easures (e.g.  replace the board of di r ectors, 
change the m anagem ent  etc.)  and condi t i ons on t r oubl ed fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons and
engage i n r egul ar  m oni t ori ng.     I t   i s unl i kel y t hat   t he I MF   wi l l   ever  be granted pow ers 
t hat  w oul d al l ow  i t  to address the m oral hazard probl em  as eff ecti vel y as nat i onal  
centr al  banks are able t o.     Thus,   i t s abil i t y t o act  as an eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of 
l ast  r esort   i s l i kel y t o r em ain l i mi t ed,  wh i ch suggest s t hat   t he uni nhi bi t ed m ovem ent   of 
capit al  around  t he  gl obe  coul d  we l l   r esult   i n  m any  mo r e f i nanci al  cri ses. 
Fi nanci al   Res t raint s
I nst i t ut i onal  str engt heni ng,  incl udi ng i mp r ovi ng prudent i al regul ati on and account i ng 
standards,   i mp l em enti ng ma j or  t r aini ng program s and upgrading t he r i sk m anagem ent  
capabil i t i es of fi nanci al int erme d i ari es in em ergi ng m arket  econom i es, are long-t erm
goal s and  can cert ainl y  not   be  accom pli shed overni ght .   A ddi t i onal l y,   t he  w eaknesses i n 
t he i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  system  are sti l l   vi sibl e and,   i n spit e of  t he ongoi ng debat e i n 
Wa s h i ngt on and elsew here
26,   i t   i s not   clear  wh e n   or  how  we l l   t hey wi l l   be addressed.
Un t i l   all   t hese  r eforms   and  str uct ural  i mp r ovem ent s are i n  pl ace,  f i nanci al  l i berali zati on 
wi l l  l i kel y rem ain a pot enti all y dest abil i zing exercise for mo s t  em ergi ng m arket
econom i es. Un t i l  t hen,  t here is consi derable scope for f i nanci al r estr aint s, such as
selecti ve cont r ol s or Chi l ean type t axes on short -term  capit al fl ow s and prudent i al
26  See  f or  exam ple  Hi l l s,  Pet erson  and  Go l dst ein  ( 1999).-21 -
cont r ol s on dom est i c int erest rates,
27 to pl ay a useful  rol e in prom ot i ng dom est i c and 
i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  stabil i t y.
5.   S u mma r y   and  Co nc l udi ng  Re ma r ks
I n spit e of  t he vol um i nous l i t erature on t he As i an f i nanci al  cri sis,  t here r em ain aspects 
of the cri sis that  are relati vel y under -researched.  O ne im port ant such aspect is the 
precise rol e played by fi nanci al l i berali zati on and t he pol i cy lessons t hat  coul d be
l earned f r om  t hi s.    Mo r e generall y,   wh i l e t here i s no short age of  pl ausibl e expl anati ons 
f or  t he cri sis l i t t l e has been done i n t erms   of  r i gorous em pir i cal  t esti ng.     Thus,   m any of 
t hese expl anati ons mu s t   be seen at  best   as t he basi s f or  f ormu l ati ng t estable em pir i cal 
hypot heses.
Thi s paper goes som e w ay i n provi di ng new  em pi r i cal evidence on t hese under-
r esearched issues.  Specif i call y,  i t  provi des evi dence on bot h t he st r engt hs and
w eaknesses of  t he  Thai   and  Ko r ean f i nanci al  system s.    I n  so doi ng,   i t   argues  t hat   wh i l e 
t hese system s perf orme d  we l l  under a vari ety of fi nanci al restr aint s, t hey w ere il l
prepared to face the ri sks and chall enges associated w it h fi nanci al li berali zati on.   In 
Thai l and t hi s led to an asset pri ce boom  and bust  cycle, as m assive capit al infl ow s 
f ound t hei r  wa y  i nt o asset ma r ket s.  The dom esti c banki ng system  w as very m uch a 
passive f ol l ow er  i n t hi s vi cious cycle wh i l e poorl y r egul ated f i nance com panies pl ayed 
a mo r e acti ve r ol e,  am pli f yi ng t he boom  and bust   cycle.    I n Ko r ea,  t here wa s   hardl y an 
asset  pri ce boom .     I nst ead capit al  f l ow s f ound t hei r   wa y   i nt o assets of  dubi ous qual i t y.
Al ong t he w ay t hey created addit i onal  vul nerabil i t i es in t he form o f  curr ency and
ma t uri t y m i s-m atches.    These vul nerabil i t i es,  coupl ed wi t h t he absence of  an eff ecti ve 
i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort ,   created f ert i l e ground  f or  f i nanci al  pani c.  Wh e n   som e 
f oreign  i nvest ors/l enders r an i t   wa s   r ati onal   f or  everyone  else t o  f ol l ow ,   as t he  eff ects of 
t he run we r e am pli f i ed by t he coll apse of  curr encies and pushed even vi able f i r ms   i nt o 
i nsol vency.
The paper also provi des a cri t i cal overvi ew  of som e w idel y di scussed poli cy
i mp l i cati ons t hat  fol l ow  fr om  t he A si an cri sis and off ers som e new  insi ght s on t hem .
Specif i call y,  it  argues t hat  besi des str engt heni ng prudent i al regul ati on and account i ng 
standards,   t here i s a need f or  upgrading  m anagem ent   system s and  expert i se t o  deal  wi t h 
f i nanci al  r i sks and an i m port ant  need f or  a mo r e wi despread understandi ng of  t he r i sks 
associated w it h fi nanci al l i berali zati on.   Fur t hermo r e, t here rem ain gaps i n t he
i nt ernat i onal  fi nanci al archit ecture, that  need to be addressed such as the need for an 
eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort   t o prevent  i nt ernat i onal   l i qui di t y cri ses f r om  
t r i ggeri ng deep recessions.  Gi ven t hat  these w eaknesses m ay requi r e a long t i me  t o 
address, fi nanci al restr aint s can act as a relati vel y cheap, eff ecti ve and t r ansparent
safety devi ce i n safeguardi ng f i nanci al  stabil i t y unt i l   em ergi ng ma r ket  econom i es ( and 
t he i nt ernat i onal  fi nanci al system ) are suff i cientl y m at ure to eff ecti vel y m anage t he 
r i sks associated wi t h f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.
Cl osi ng,  I w oul d l i ke t o l i st som e unansw ered, albei t  chall engi ng quest i ons t hat  lend 
t hem sel ves t o f urt her  em pir i cal  t esti ng.     These are as f ol l ow s:
27  For   f urt her  det ail s of  t he  prudent i al  eff ects of  i nt erest  r ate  r estr aint s see  De me t r i ades  ( 1998).-22 -
1. There is a w idespread beli ef that  the i nadequat e m anagem ent  of ri sk observed i n 
Eas t   As i a f ol l ow i ng t he openi ng up of  f i nanci al  ma r ket s wa s   a sym ptom  of  mo r al 
hazard behavi or.   Ho we v e r ,  t here is hardl y any em pi rical evidence on t hi s
hypot hesi s.  A n alt ernat i ve hypot hesi s, put  forwa r d i n t hi s paper,  is that  the ri sks 
we r e m is-m anaged because t hey we r e under-esti ma t ed ( or  not   f ul l y understood)  as 
a r esult   of:     ( i )   t he euphori a wh i ch surr ounded t he m acroeconom i c perf orma n c e   of 
t hese count r i es and f i nanci al  l i berali zati on;   ( i i )   t he credibl e pegged exchange r ates 
t hat  we r e in pl ace before the A si an cri sis.  W hi l e it  i s not  at all  obvi ous or
str aight f orwa r d t o devi ce appropri ate em pir i cal tests of thi s hypot hesi s, it s poli cy
i mp l i cati ons are so pow erf ul  that  it  is w ort h i nvest i ng i n new  m et hodol ogi es for 
doi ng so.
2. W hat   wa s   t he extent  of  over-shoot i ng of  exchange r ates i n t he curr ency cri ses and 
i t s im pact on t hese econom i es? M any fi r m s becam e insol vent  aft er t he cri sis
di r ectl y as a result  of excessive deval uat i ons,  wh i ch exacerbat ed the cri sis and
prol onged t he recovery peri od.   In t he presence of an int ernat i onal  lender of last 
r esort   t hi s coul d have been avoi ded;   i nst ead of  a f ul l -blow n f i nanci al  cri sis we   ma y  
have  seen r elati vel y  m odest   r ecessions.  
3. The evidence presented i n t hi s paper  i ndi cates t hat   stock ma r ket s i n bot h Thai l and 
and K orea exhibi t  i m port ant i neff i ciencies.  The r e is consi derable scope for
expandi ng  t hi s analysi s t o  i ncl ude  ot her  count r i es,  and  t o  use  hi gher  f r equency  dat a.
I t   i s also possibl e t o t est  f or  t he presence of  specif i c t ypes of  i neff i ciencies such as 
bubbl es and to t est f or f i nanci al l i berali zati on i nduced i ncreases in ri sk (usi ng
ARCH- GARCH mode l s).   These types of t ests are li kel y t o deepen our
understandi ng of  t he m echanism s t hat   we r e r esponsi bl e f or  t he cri sis.    I t   ma y   also 
go  som e wa y   i n  expl aini ng  t he  behavi or  of  f oreign  i nvest ors,  i ncl udi ng  herdi ng.
4 . A wi der i ssue that  surf aces concerns t he eff i ciency and equit y i mp l i cati ons of
corr ectl y sequenced f i nanci al  l i berali zati on.     Ther e are l arge econom i es of  scale i n 
r i sk m anagem ent  system s, wh i c h  ma y  ma k e  s ma l l er f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons non-
vi able.    Ye t   sm all er,   l ocali zed,  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  are t hose  t hat   are mo r e l i kel y  t o 
have i nforma t i onal  advant ages over l arger ones and are, t herefore, i n a good
posi t i on t o serve t he needs of SM Es,  l ocal com m uni t i es and low  i ncom e
househol ds.   There is in fact very l i t t l e research on t hi s issue, wh i ch given i t s 
i m port ance,  ought   t o  be  t he  subj ect  of  a ma j or  r esearch eff ort .
Da t a  Appendi x
Thai l and
Ext ernal   l i abi l i t i es ( LEL)
Da t a on external  assets of int ernat i onal  banks i n t he report i ng area
28 vi s-à-vi s all   sectors i n 
Thai l and  ( wh i ch corr espond  t o  Thai l and’s external   l i abil i t i es)  we r e obt ained  f r om   t heBank  f or 
I nt ernat i onal  Set t l em ents, Q uart erly Review : Int ernat i onal  Banki ng and Fi nanci al  M arket
28 Report i ng area consists of A ustria, Be l gi um,  De n ma r k,  Fi nl and,  Fr ance, Ge r m any,  Ir eland,  It aly,
Luxem bourg,  Ne t herl ands,  No r wa y ,  Spai n,  Sw eden, Swi t zerl and,  Un i t ed K ingdom ,  Canada,  Japan,
Un i t ed States, and ot her report i ng off shore centr es (Ba ha ma s ,  Ba hr ain,  Ca yma n I slands,  H ong K ong,  
Si ngapore  and  Ot her) .-23 -
D evelopm ent s( vari ous i ssues).   The  dat a wa s   t r ansforme d   i nt o l ocal  curr ency usi ng exchange 
r ate dat a f r om  t he IMF ,   I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs ( vari ous  i ssues).   The  exchange r ate 
dat a for 1998 w ere obt ained fr om  Bank of Thai l and w ebsi t e at t he fol l ow i ng address:
ht t p:/ / www. bot . or. t h/ govnr/ publ i c/BO T_H om epage/ Engl i shV ersion/ i ndex_e.ht m.
The  seri es i n l ocal  curr ency wa s   defl ated usi ng t he consum er  pri ce i ndex ( CPI )   obt ained f r om  
I MF ,   I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs ( vari ous  i ssues).
Do me s t i c Bank  Cr e di t   ( LC)
Da t a on claims  o f  dom est i c m oney banks on pri vat e sector we r e obt ained fr om  t he IMF ,
I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs ( vari ous  i ssues).   The  dat a f or  1998  we r e obt ained  f r om   Bank 
of Thai l and w ebsi t e. The s er i es w as defl ated using t he consum er pri ce index (CPI )  obt ained 
f r om IMF ,   I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs. 
Fi nanci al   Res t raint s ( FR)
The f i nanci al restr aint s index i s const r uct ed using qual i t ati ve dat a on i nt erest rates restr aint s 
and  cont r ol s of  port f ol i o  i nfl ow s.   Specif i call y,   i t   i s t he  ari t hm et i c average of  t he  f ol l ow i ng  t hree 
d u mmy   vari ables,  wh i ch t ake t he val ue 1 i f   a cont r ol   i s present  and 0 ot herwi se:  l endi ng r ate 
cont r ol s d u mmy ,   deposi t   r ate cont r ol s d u mmy ,   and port f ol i o i nvest me n t   cont r ol s d u mmy .   The 
dat a w ere obt ained fr om  Bank  of  Thai l and Annual  Report s (vari ous i ssues);  The Thai l and 
De v e l opm ent  R esearch Inst i t ut e (1998), Thai l and’s F inanci al  Syst em : St ructure and
Li beral i zati on,Thai l and:The Thai l and De v e l opm ent   R esearch I nst i t ut e( 1998);   and  Johnst on,  
B. ,   S.   Do r bar,   and  C. Echeverr i a ( 1997),   “ Sequenci ng  Ca pi t al  A ccount   Li berali zati on:   Lessons 
f r om  t he Experi ences i n Chi l e,  I ndonesi a,  Ko r ea,  and Thai l and”,  IMF   Wo r k i ng Paper ,  97/ 157,
Wa s h i ngt on:   I nt ernat i onal   M onet ary  Fund.
St ock  Pr i ces  ( LP)
Da t a on  t he  stock  pri ce i ndex  i n  l ocal  curr ency we r e obt ained  f r om   t he  I FC,   Emer gi ng  M arket 
Da t aBase.
Broad  Cl ai ms   on  Pr i vate Sector  ( LCB)
Br oad cl aims  r efer to pri vat e claim s on pri vat e sector of deposi t  m oney banks and pri vat e 
claims   on  pri vat e sector  of  f i nance  and  securi t i es com panies.  Da t a we r e obt ained  f r om   t he  I MF ,  
I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al  St ati sti cs.  Da t a f or  1998  we r e obt ained  f r om   Bank  of  Thai l and  we b s i t e.
K orea
Ext ernal   l i abi l i t i es(LEL)
Da t a on  external   assets of  i nt ernat i onal   banks  i n  t he  r eport i ng  area vi s-à-vi s all   sectors i n  Ko r ea 
( wh i ch corr espond t o K orea’s external  l i abil i t i es) we r e obt ained fr om  t he Bank f or
I nt ernat i onal  Set t l em ents, Q uart erly Review : Int ernat i onal  Banki ng and Fi nanci al  M arket
D evelopm ent s( vari ous i ssues).   The  dat a wa s   t r ansforme d   i nt o l ocal  curr ency usi ng exchange 
r ate dat a f r om  t he IMF ,   I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs ( vari ous i ssues).   The  exchange r ate 
dat a for 1998 w ere obt ained fr om  Bank of Ko r ea w ebsit e at t he fol l ow i ng address:
ht t p:/ / www. bok. or. kr/kb/i ndex_e.ht ml .   The  seri es i n  l ocal  curr ency wa s   defl ated usi ng  t he  GDP 
defl ator.
Do me s t i c Cr e di t   ( LC)
Da t a on claims   of  dom est i c m oney banks and non-bank f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons on pri vat e sector 
( i ncl udi ng t r ust  account s) we r e obt ained fr om  t he IMF ,  Int ernat i onal  Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs
( vari ous  i ssues).   The  dat a f or  1998  we r e obt ained  f r om   Bank  of  Ko r ea we b s i t e.  The  seri es wa s  
defl ated usi ng  t he  GDP  defl ator.  -24 -
Fi nanci al   Res t raint s ( FR)
The f i nanci al restr aint s index i s const r uct ed using qual i t ati ve dat a on t he l i berali zati on of 
i nt erest  r ates and port f ol i o i nfl ow s.   Specif i call y,   i t   i s t he ari t hm et i c average of  t he f ol l ow i ng 
f our dum m y vari ables w hi ch t ake t he val ue 1 i f   a cont r ol   i s present  and 0 ot herwi se:  l endi ng 
r ate contr ol s  d u mmy ,  deposi t  rate contr ol s  d u mmy ,  m oney m arket  rates contr ol  dum m y and 
port f ol i o i nvest me n t  cont r ol s  d u mmy .  The dat a w ere obt ained fr om  Bank of   Kor e a  Annual  
Report s ( vari ous  i ssues);   and Johnst on,   B. ,   S.   Do r bar,   and C. Echeverr i a ( 1997),   “ Sequenci ng 
Ca pi t al  A ccount   Li berali zati on:   Lessons f r om  t he Experi ences i n Chi l e,  I ndonesi a,  Ko r ea,  and 
Thai l and”,IMF   Wo r k i ng  Paper,   97/ 157,   Wa s h i ngt on:   I nt ernat i onal   M onet ary  Fund.
St ock  pri ces ( LP)
Da t a on  t he  stock  pri ce i ndex  i n  l ocal  curr ency we r e obt ained  f r om   t he  I FC,   Emer gi ng  M arket 
Da t aBase.
GDP  ( LY)   and  GDP  De f l at or
Th e  GDP d a t a and the dat a used to const r uct  the G D P defl ator we r e obt ained fr om  IMF ,
I nt ernat i onal   Fi nanci al   St at i sti cs  ( vari ous  i ssues).
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Fi gure 2.   K orea
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